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Abstract 
 
Activist Short-Sellers and Accounting Fraud Allegations 
 
Antonis Kartapanis, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisors:  Dain Donelson and Ross Jennings 
 
This study examines the predictive power of accounting fraud allegations by 
activist short-sellers and costs imposed by allegations that are subsequently not confirmed. 
Importantly, only 30% of the allegations are later confirmed. Although there is a high rate 
of unconfirmed allegations, activist short-sellers still provide the strongest signal that a 
firm has committed accounting fraud relative to other commonly used fraud predictors. 
These allegations also help improve the efficacy of the legal system as securities class 
actions containing allegations similar to those of activist short-sellers are more likely to 
settle. Unconfirmed fraud allegations impose some costs on targeted firms as they increase 
non-meritorious litigation risk and audit fees, but the costs are not significant enough to 
affect profitability. Further, unconfirmed fraud allegations temporarily depress prices and 
increase information asymmetry, thus negatively affecting capital markets. Overall, the 
findings suggest that executives’ concerns regarding false allegations are valid, but at the 
same time, activist short-sellers’ allegations are a strong predictor of accounting fraud. The 
findings should be of interest to regulators who are concerned with false rumors spreading 
in the market. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
What role do short-sellers play in accounting fraud detection, and at what cost? Failure to 
detect fraud in a timely manner can cause large losses to investors, employees, and creditors. 
However, false accusations can impose costs on firms and disrupt capital markets. This study 
investigates publicly disclosed accounting fraud allegations by short-sellers with a focus on two 
research objectives: 1) evaluate the predictive power of these reports in identifying accounting 
fraud and 2) estimate costs imposed by ex post unconfirmed fraud allegations. 
Passive short-sellers (i.e., investors who take short positions without issuing any public 
disclosures) are sophisticated investors who often act as an effective external governance 
mechanism (Desai et al. 2006b; Boehmer and Wu 2013).  Over the past decade, however, there 
has been a substantial increase in the presence of activist short-sellers (hereafter activists). In 
contrast to passive short-sellers, activists take a short position and then publish reports explaining 
their reasoning. These reports often include warnings regarding accounting fraud. Zhao (2018) 
reports that 28% of activists’ reports include such allegations.  
However, there is substantial controversy surrounding activists’ allegations. Executives 
claim that the allegations are driven by activists’ profit incentives which lead activists to make 
false allegations (Lamont 2012; Walker and Forbes 2013). The stronger the allegation, the larger 
the price decline and the larger the profit to short-sellers. During the 2008 financial crisis, multiple 
false rumors spread in the market. Frustrated with the rumors, JPMorgan Chase’s CEO, Jamie 
Dimon, stated that short-sellers spreading false rumors should serve jail time (Lewis 2008). 
Similarly, SEC chairman Cox (2008) stated that false rumors caused an irrational panic that 
threatened market integrity and that “market cops” should “punish those responsible.” Regulators 
in Canada and around the world share similar concerns (Shecter 2017).   
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Litigation and reputation risks could constrain activists from making false allegations. 
However, these constraints may be overstated. Although multiple firms have sued activists for 
spreading false and defamatory information, these lawsuits have had little success due to the high 
bar to prove defamatory intent even if allegations prove false (Lamont 2012; Walker and Forbes 
2013). Former SEC attorney Mark Fickes stated, “it seems odd to many that you could publicly 
trash a company and affect its stock price negatively and that somehow there would be no 
consequences for that” (Bloomberg 2014).  
Reputation concerns should be more effective in constraining false allegations (Weigelt 
and Camerer 1988). Inaccurate accusations can damage an activist’s reputation and reduce the 
credibility of future allegations which can damage future profit (Jackson 2005; Ljungqvist and 
Qian 2016). Carson Block, head of Muddy Waters Capital, states that the best way for activists to 
receive acceptance is to prove they are good at what they do (Bryan 2016).  
An inaccurate allegation can be unintentional or intentional. For example, activists may 
rely on noisy measures (e.g., ratio analysis) that lead them to wrong conclusions. On the other 
hand, activists may intentionally falsely accuse firms or exaggerate findings to profit.1 Empirically 
distinguishing between these two is difficult. Thus, the purpose of this study is not to identify 
whether activists intentionally falsely accuse firms of fraud. Rather, the purpose is to examine how 
accurately activists identify fraud and costs associated with allegations that the SEC or the courts 
do not later confirm (hereafter unconfirmed allegations). 
                                                 
1 Alfred Little’s report against Silvercorp Metals Inc. presents an example of activists’ exaggerating findings. The 
activist hired two geologists to examine discrepancies between Chinese and SEC filings in production levels and 
quantity of resources. The geologists concluded that the discrepancies could be explained by the different measures 
used in the two countries. Alfred Little then asked the second geologist to take a harder stance as his conclusion was 
“too vague and not damaging enough” and then selectively included information from that report in his article. The 
company sued the activist in the US, but the case was dismissed due to first amendment protection. In 2015, the 
British Columbia Securities Commission reviewed the case and concluded that while the conduct was “unsavory, we 
do not find it was clearly abusive to the capital markets and therefore it is not necessary to make an order in the 
public interest.” See https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Enforcement/Decisions/PDF/2015_BCSECCOM_187. 
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To construct the sample, I use Activist Insights (AI), SeekingAlpha, and major activists’ 
websites to identify short-selling reports alleging accounting fraud. The final sample consists of 
159 unique cases of alleged fraud (hereafter campaigns) initiated between 2006 and 2015. 
Consistent with activists being the first to raise the fraud allegations, I find a large increase in the 
number of unique visitors accessing the targeted firms’ EDGAR filings and a large negative market 
reaction upon publication of the initial report of each campaign relative to the prior 20 days. 
I classify campaigns as containing confirmed fraud allegations if there is a later settled 
Security Class Action (SCA) or an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Action (AAER). 
Overall, activists’ fraud allegations are confirmed 30% of the time, a much higher accuracy rate 
relative to other commonly used fraud predictors. In a multivariate analysis, using firm-years on 
Compustat from 2006 to 2015, I find that the probability a firm has committed fraud increases by 
22 percentage points if an activist alleges so versus 3 to 4 percentage points if the firm is ranked 
among those with the highest abnormal short interest, F-score, or abnormal audit fees. Moreover, 
activists have the highest precision and lowest type II error (false negative) rates among the 
variables examined in this study.2 Focusing on the precision rate, for every 100 firm-years 
identified as potentially fraudulent using extreme values of abnormal short interest, F-score, or 
abnormal audit fees, only 5 to 7 are indeed fraudulent. Thus, it may not be cost beneficial for the 
SEC to solely rely on those measures for investigative purposes. On the other hand, for every 100 
firm-years investigated based on activists’ allegations, the SEC would identify 25 fraudulent firm-
years.  
                                                 
2 For example, I do not include allegations made by analysts, or the media. Potentially, these agents may be more 
accurate in their allegations and have a lower type II error. However, in terms of predictive power, it is unlikely that 
the inclusion of such allegations will result in activists’ fraud allegations providing no additional predictive power. 
That is because although firms targeted by activists may potentially exhibit high abnormal accruals and F-score 
(which makes it crucial to control for such variables), they are not targeted by the media or analysts as activists are 
the first to bring the fraud allegations to light. 
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Prior research finds that activists target firms with weak corporate governance (Chen 2016; 
Zhao 2018). Thus, although the prior results suggest that activists’ fraud allegations predict fraud 
commission, it may be the case that in general firms targeted by activists, even with allegations 
unrelated to accounting fraud (hereafter non-fraud allegations) such as overvaluation, are more 
likely to commit fraud. As such, the fraud allegation itself may not provide any additional 
predictive power, and what really matters is whether the firm is being targeted by an activist. Using 
a sample that includes firms targeted by activists either for accounting fraud or for other reasons 
unrelated to fraud, I find that firms targeted specifically with fraud allegations have a 19 
percentage point higher probability of having committed fraud. Thus, overall the findings suggest 
that activists’ fraud allegations provide additional predictive power after controlling for other 
commonly used fraud predictors. 
Unconfirmed allegations, however, may impose costs on targeted firms such as raising 
non-meritorious litigation risk and audit fees. It is unclear, though, how significant these costs may 
be. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that these firms, relative to a group of firms 
targeted with non-fraud allegations, experience an increase of 9 percentage points in non-
meritorious litigation risk and an increase of 15% in audit fees over the two years following the 
allegations. Nevertheless, these costs do not appear to be large enough to affect future earnings. 
I then examine the overall effect of the fraud allegations on the legal system. Specifically, 
I examine whether SCAs containing allegations similar to those of activists are more likely to 
survive a motion to dismiss and settle.3 The courts have limited resources and crowded dockets 
(Fisch 2001). These resources are best used when examining meritorious cases (Donelson et al. 
2018). If activists’ allegations are mostly inaccurate but still result in a SCA filing, then these 
                                                 
3 Ideally, I would also examine whether SEC investigations are more likely to result in a formal enforcement action; 
however, disclosure of SEC investigations is not mandatory (Stuart and Wilson 2009). 
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cases, relative to the remaining SCAs, will be more likely to get dismissed and thus undermine the 
deterrence effect of securities litigation (Pritchard 2002; Hylton 2008). However, if most 
allegations resulting in a SCA filing are accurate, then they will be more likely to settle. Using 
SCAs filed from 2006 to 2015, I find that these cases have a 19 percentage point higher probability 
of settling. Thus, the legal system benefits in terms of efficient resource allocation.  
I next examine costs imposed by unconfirmed fraud allegations on shareholders. Although 
it is expected that the market will react negatively to activists’ reports, it is unclear, ex ante, how 
strong the reaction will be and how long it will take for prices to recover for firms facing 
unconfirmed fraud allegations. Using all reports included in Activist Insights, I find a significant 
negative reaction to activists’ unconfirmed fraud allegations. A shareholder buying shares just 
prior to the issuance of the reports and selling the day after will experience losses of 5.8% (7.6% 
concentrating on the initial report of each campaign). The initial negative reaction slowly reverses 
over the following year. This reversal is in stark contrast to firms facing confirmed fraud 
allegations and non-fraud allegations as they continue to experience negative returns throughout 
the year. Further, information asymmetry for firms facing unconfirmed fraud allegations increases, 
relative to the control group of non-fraud allegations, following the release of the reports. Thus, 
unconfirmed fraud allegations temporarily distort capital markets. 
Finally, I examine whether activists’ accuracy and costs from unconfirmed allegations vary 
based on whether the allegation was against a firm listed in the US through a reverse merger 
(hereafter RM firms) or a traditionally listed firm (hereafter traditional firms). Activists were 
credited with uncovering fraud committed by RM firms (Lee et al. 2015; Chen 2016). However, 
findings from that setting may not generalize to other settings. First, it is unlikely for such a fraud 
to re-occur as the SEC now highly scrutinizes those firms. Second, activists identified most of 
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those cases by comparing SEC to Chinese (SAIC) filings to identify inconsistencies or visited 
manufacturing locations to verify their existence. A more ‘traditional’ accounting fraud cannot be 
detected this way. The findings suggest that activists were about twice as accurate in uncovering 
fraud committed by RM firms. Further, costs imposed by unconfirmed allegations against 
traditional firms appear to be larger.  
The findings of this study should be of interest to regulators, such as the SEC and the 
Ontario Securities Commission, who are interested in protecting market integrity from false 
rumors. Although it is difficult to monetize all costs and benefits arising from these allegations, 
this study provides insights of their effects on firms, the legal system, and the market. 
Further, this study makes two primary contributions to the academic literature. First, it 
contributes to the stream of literature examining short-sellers as external corporate governance 
mechanisms. Prior studies conclude that passive short-sellers are effective at identifying firms 
misreporting (e.g., Desai et al. 2006b; Karpoff and Lou 2010). This study confirms those results 
by looking at activists and presents evidence that activists provide a much stronger signal that a 
firm has committed fraud when compared to abnormal short interest (see Karpoff and Lou 2010). 
Further, not only is the signal stronger, but it is also less costly for the SEC and shareholders to 
investigate given the relatively low number of cases. Importantly, however, activists make a lot of 
unconfirmed allegations as executives argue, which imposes some costs on targeted firms. These 
unconfirmed allegations also hurt shareholders trading in response to these reports. 
Second, concentrating on confirmed allegations, the study contributes to the literature 
examining different sources of fraud revelation (Miller 2006; Dyck et al. 2010). These results 
suggest that an external watchdog which, in the past, did not participate in uncovering fraud is now 
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actively doing so. Although Dyck et al. (2010) find only five fraud cases uncovered by activists, 
this study finds more than 40 such instances.4    
  
                                                 
4 Dyck et al. (2010) concentrate on fraud cases with settlements over $3M and total assets over $750M. 
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Chapter 2: Prior research 
2.1 PASSIVE SHORT-SELLERS AS A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 
Previous research provides evidence that passive short-sellers to be sophisticated investors. 
Early studies find that highly shorted firms later underperform (Asquith and Meulbroek 1995; 
Desai et al. 2002). Short-sellers increase their positions prior to restatements, firm disclosures that 
result in securities fraud filings, and revelation of financial misconduct (Griffin 2004; Desai et al. 
2006b; Karpoff and Lou 2010). Short-sellers also appear to trade on accrual quality as short 
positions are positively related with accruals for firms restating (Desai et al. 2006b). Karpoff and 
Lou (2010) find that short-sellers take larger positions in firms with more severe 
misrepresentations and that short interest is positively related with how quickly the misconduct is 
revealed. 
Prior studies further show that passive short-sellers also deter earnings management. Rule 
202T of Regulation SHO facilitated short-selling for about one third of the Russel 3000 firms by 
exempting those firms from price tests for a pilot period from May 2, 2005 to August 6, 2007. 
Using this setting, Fang et al. (2016) find that affected firms decreased (increased) earnings 
management during (after) the pilot study. The study also shows that the decrease in short-selling 
costs helped short-sellers reveal fraud committed during the pre-pilot period. Overall, prior studies 
conclude that passive short-sellers both detect and prevent earnings management.  
This study differs from the earlier mentioned studies in three ways. First, these studies 
mainly focus on ex post confirmed cases (e.g., the firm faces an SEC action). In contrast, 
Richardson (2003) studies a large sample of firms without conditioning on ex post confirmation. 
He finds that short-sellers do not trade on accruals, calling into question how informative short 
positions are. I similarly examine all activists’ fraud allegations unconditional of their veracity. 
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Second, most studies use observed short interest to infer short-sellers’ beliefs. In contrast, 
I concentrate on cases where activists publicly allege that a firm commits fraud. Activists’ 
allegations should provide a stronger signal to shareholders and regulators. Karpoff and Lou 
(2010) find that about 2% of firm-months in the top 5% of abnormal short interest commit fraud, 
and this is significantly higher than for the rest of the firms. This suggests that abnormal short 
interest can be used to identify fraud, but implies that to use this as an investigative tool, the SEC 
and shareholders would have to examine hundreds of firms to identify a few committing fraud. 
Given resource constraints, this may not be cost effective. As activists explicitly identify their 
targets and specific issues, investors and the SEC can focus on significantly fewer firms. 
Finally, in contrast to passive short-sellers, activists may spread “panic” to the market. A 
good example is Barry Minkow, formerly the CEO of ZZZZ Best. After serving his prison 
sentence, he became an activist short-seller. In 2011, Minkow pleaded guilty to securities fraud 
related to falsely accusing Lennar Corp. of deceptive accounting. The firm’s market value declined 
by about $580M (Whelan 2011). Minkow did so for personal gain and knew that the allegations 
were false. Passive short-sellers do not have such power as the market can only speculate as to the 
reasoning behind their trades. Thus, activists face different incentives and it is ambiguous whether 
findings from prior studies on passive short-sellers generalize to activists. 
2.2 ACTIVIST SHORT-SELLERS 
Over the past five years, there has been an increasing interest from academics in activists. 
However, the number of studies is relatively limited due to data availability. Ljungqvist and Qian 
(2016) show that short-sellers with limited capital can correct overvaluation by publicly disclosing 
their research, thus affecting the trade behavior of investors with long positions. Chen (2016) finds 
that among Chinese cross-listed firms, activists are more likely to target firms with weaker 
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corporate governance. He finds a negative market reaction upon the report publication for both 
targeted firms as well as their peers. Zhao (2018) examines ex ante features that attract activists 
and implications for future returns. He shows that firms with ex ante overvaluation characteristics 
experience significant negative returns following activists’ campaigns.  
Most of these studies assume, and in part try to show, that activists’ reports are accurate 
and thus the market should react to their publication. Ljungqvist and Qian (2016), for example, 
conclude that the vast majority of the reports are accurate. They draw this conclusion from the fact 
that, for more than 90% of the reports in their sample, at some point following the allegation, a 
SCA was filed, the SEC/DoJ started an investigation, and/or the stock exchange took some sort of 
action. However, this argument blurs two concepts: 1) rationally following up on reports with 
potentially correct information and 2) the information indeed being correct. For example, 
dismissed SCAs should not be interpreted as validation of a report’s accuracy. Thus, I conduct 
more powerful tests using outcomes from litigation and investigations, which are only preliminary 
steps. 
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis development 
3.1 PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF ACTIVISTS’ FRAUD ALLEGATIONS 
Prior studies show that passive short-sellers are sophisticated investors who can act as 
external monitors. Karpoff and Lou (2010) show a positive association between high abnormal 
short interest and months in which financial reports were manipulated. Further, Dyck et al. (2010) 
find that passive short-sellers, and to a lesser degree activists, identified some major fraud cases. 
Given these findings, and assuming that attributes from passive short-sellers generalize to activists, 
this could suggest that activists can identify fraud and thus their reports could be informative. As 
such, activists’ fraud allegations could be highly predictive of accounting fraud. Further, litigation 
and reputation risks could help minimize the number of reports with unsubstantiated allegations. 
Activists can be sued and even if the probability of losing is low, litigation expenses can be high. 
Further, unsubstantiated allegations can hurt an activist’s reputation and affect future profits. 
Indeed, prior research finds that the market reacts less to activists with lower reputation 
(Ljungqvist and Qian 2016; Zhao 2018). 
On the other hand, executives have long argued that many of activists’ reports are 
inaccurate (Lamont 2012; Walker and Forbes 2013). These concerns are shared by regulators in 
the US and around the world (Shecter 2017).  For example, false rumors were so widespread in 
2008 that the SEC temporarily banned short-selling in financial institutions (SEC 2008). This 
could imply that many allegations are inaccurate and, as such, may have no predictive power. 
Further, after controlling for other commonly used measures in the accounting and finance 
literatures to predict fraud, such as the F-score (Dechow et al. 2011), activists’ fraud allegations 
may provide low if any incremental predictive power if activists mainly rely on these measures to 
identify their targets. I state hypothesis 1 in its alternative form: 
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H1: Activist short-sellers’ fraud allegations provide incremental predictive power over 
other commonly used fraud predictors in identifying firms committing accounting fraud. 
3.2 COSTS OF UNCONFIRMED FRAUD ALLEGATIONS TO TARGETED FIRMS 
To the extent activist fraud allegations are not subsequently confirmed, these unconfirmed 
fraud allegations may increase a firm’s non-meritorious litigation risk for at least two reasons. 
First, attorneys may be unable to tell, ex ante, which reports contain allegations that will be 
confirmed ex post and thus follow up on even inaccurate reports. Second, even if they can 
distinguish, attorneys may still file a SCA. In deciding whether to file a SCA, lawyers consider the 
expected payoff of a case which is based on the probability of settling and the expected settlement 
amount (Donelson et al. 2018). Zhao (2018) finds a significant negative reaction to the release of 
fraud related reports which increases the maximum damages a lawyer can claim. Thus, the 
expected settlement amount, which is based on damages, is relatively high, and the case becomes 
attractive to lawyers even if the probability of settling is low (Donelson et al. 2018). As such, 
targeted firms may experience an increase in non-meritorious litigation risk. I state hypothesis 2a 
in its alternative form: 
H2a: Unconfirmed fraud allegations increase targeted firms’ non-meritorious litigation 
risk. 
A perceived increase in litigation risk and the additional scrutiny of the firm’s filings may 
result in higher audit fees. Prior research suggests that auditors’ costs consist of 1) effort and 
resources required to complete the audit and 2) litigation risk (Simunic and Stein 1996). Prior 
studies indeed find that an increase in litigation risk increases audit fees (Choi et al. 2009; 
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Badertscher et al. 2014; Abbott et al. 2017).5 However, most of these studies examine settings with 
a substantial increase in litigation risk, such as firms going public. It is unclear, ex ante, whether 
the increase in litigation risk due to activists’ allegations is of sufficient magnitude to result in 
higher audit fees. I state hypothesis 2b in its alternative form: 
H2b: Unconfirmed fraud allegations increase targeted firms’ audit fees. 
These allegations may also distract executives and affect suppliers’ and customers’ 
perception of the firm, thus negatively impacting earnings. This is a common concern for non-
meritorious litigation which resembles unconfirmed allegations (Choi 2004). However, these costs 
may be overstated. Donelson and Yust (2017) do not find any evidence of a decrease in earnings 
following SCA filings that are eventually dismissed. Moser (2018) also finds that sued firms with 
ex ante high probability of having the SCA dismissed actually experience a decrease in cost of 
capital. This implies that firms facing uncorroborated allegations may not incur significant costs. 
Further, although specific expenses, such as audit fees, may increase, it is unclear whether earnings 
will be significantly affected given the relatively low amount of audit fees generally paid by firms. 
I state hypothesis 2c in its alternative form:  
H2c: Unconfirmed fraud allegations negatively impact targeted firms’ earnings. 
3.3 OVERALL IMPACT ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
The law literature has long recognized that the legal system has limited resources (e.g., 
limited number of federal judges) (Bernstein 1978; Fisch 2001). The growth in federal courts’ 
dockets has been outpacing judicial appointments (Bainbridge and Gulati 2002). To maximize 
                                                 
5 Litigation risk may increase audit fees through at least two channels (see Badertscher et al. 2014). First, auditors 
may charge a premium for the additional litigation risk they bear. Second, auditors may exert additional audit effort 
to reduce their exposure. For the purpose of this paper, the distinction is irrelevant and given that I do not have 
access to audit hours, it is impossible to isolate (see Badertscher et al. 2014). 
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efficient use of their time, judges are better served overseeing meritorious SCAs (Donelson et al. 
2018). Fraud allegations by activists may help improve the system’s efficiency. If activists’ reports 
are mostly accurate, then SCAs raising allegations similar to those in activists’ reports should be 
more likely to settle (i.e., have higher merits) compared to the remaining SCAs.  
However, executives and regulators are concerned about “false rumors.” These reports, as 
discussed in more detail in the prior section, may wrongly result in a SCA filing either because 
attorneys cannot distinguish between reports or because ex ante they find it profitable to do so. As 
such, these reports may result in an inefficient use of the judicial system’s resources. Ex ante, it is 
unclear which of the two effects will dominate. Thus, I state hypothesis 3 in its null form: 
H3: SCAs raising allegations similar to those of activists or directly naming activists in the 
complaint have similar merits to the average SCA and are thus just as likely to settle. 
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Chapter 4: Sample 
4.1 FRAUD ALLEGATIONS 
I use three sources to construct my sample of activists’ fraud allegations. First, I collect 
activists’ reports from Activist Insights (AI).6 This dataset contains reports from 98 activists up 
through December 31, 2015. AI classifies each report based on its primary allegation and contains 
18 classifications (see Zhao 2018). I use reports classified as Accounting fraud, Major business 
fraud, and Misleading accounting. To ensure that Misleading accounting reports allege intentional 
U.S. GAAP violations, I read the summaries provided by AI and remove cases not fitting this 
definition. Excluded reports usually allege that a firm strategically included/excluded certain items 
in calculating non-GAAP measures. After removing observations with missing data on Compustat 
and CRSP, the AI sample contains 148 fraud related reports for 106 campaigns.7  
Second, I obtain “Short Ideas” articles from SeekingAlpha from February 13, 2006 (first 
published report) to December 31, 2015. The sample ends in 2015 to allow time for 1) investors 
to file a SCA and observe the outcome and 2) the SEC to bring a formal enforcement action. I 
identify 2,124 articles that include one of the following keywords: 1) “fraud,” 2) “mislead,” 3) 
“overstat,” and 4) “understat.” I exclude 940 articles for which the authors’ disclosure suggests 
they do not currently hold a short position in the company (Zhao 2018). I then read the remaining 
articles and keep those that indeed allege accounting fraud. Appendix 1 provides examples of 
articles included and excluded from the final sample. The final SeekingAlpha sample consists of 
210 reports regarding 115 campaigns. There is an overlap between campaigns included in AI and 
SeekingAlpha. Overall, I identify 49 additional campaigns using SeekingAlpha.8 
                                                 
6 I would like to thank Wuyang Zhao for generously providing me access to his data. 
7 A campaign contains reports with similar allegations or reports published within a short period of each other. 
8 Upon further examination, 13 of these campaigns are also in AI but are not classified as fraud cases. As such, I 
reclassify their designation in AI to fraud related and the total AI campaigns increase from 106 to 119. 
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Finally, I search major activists’ websites. AI is more comprehensive beginning in 2011 
and, until about 2010, SeekingAlpha was not widely used by these activists. I collect 29 additional 
reports and overall identify another four campaigns. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics regarding the sample composition. The 
final sample includes 159 campaigns. There is a fairly large number of activists (88) involved in 
these campaigns. Activists rarely initiate a second campaign against the same firm (only 8 such 
cases). Panel B of Table 1 presents the number of campaigns covered by activists. About 66% of 
the activists are involved in only one campaign. These are mainly smaller/lesser known activists 
publishing on SeekingAlpha. Importantly, about 19% of activists are involved in four or more 
campaigns. Thus, for some activists, identifying fraud appears to be an important task. 
Figures 1a and 1b provide some evidence that activists are indeed the first to bring the 
accounting fraud allegations and are not simply rebroadcasting information that has already been 
available to the market (e.g., the media or analysts have already reported on). I concentrate on the 
first report of each campaign and look at buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) (Figure 1a) and 
EDGAR activity (Figure 1b) for the 21-day period leading to publication day (e.g., t-20 to t). Both 
figures suggest that the reports bring new information to the market. Figure 1a shows that BHAR 
goes from -2.5% the day prior to -10% the day of the publication. Figure 1b similarly shows that 
the number of unique visitors on EDGAR almost doubles on the day of publication relative to the 
prior 20 days.9 Further, Appendix 2 provides an example in which the SCA directly names the 
activists as the first to reveal the fraud. 
                                                 
9 I note that the pattern for EDGAR views is very similar if I examine 1) total views or 2) total views of non-index 
files instead of unique visitors. Further, the pattern is very similar if I examine the percent of daily views or percent 
of unique visitors instead of using the raw numbers. 
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4.2 CONFIRMED FRAUD ALLEGATIONS 
I consider two measures in identifying whether a campaign contains confirmed allegations. 
First, for each campaign, I search Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse to identify 
whether a SCA was filed against the firm after the initial fraud report. For each lawsuit, I read the 
complaint to ensure that the allegations raised are similar to those of activists. I consider campaigns 
with a settled SCA alleging a Section 10(b) violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or 
Rule 10b-5 violation to include confirmed allegations (Choi and Pritchard 2016). 
Second, I examine whether the SEC issued an AAER with a Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 
violation against the company following the release of the initial fraud report. To identify whether 
an AAER was brought against the firm, I first examine the Berkeley Center for Financial Reporting 
and Management (CFRM) database and then search the SEC’s website. 
Table 2 presents the total number of campaigns and number of campaigns with confirmed 
fraud allegations by year. The number of campaigns has been increasing over the sample period 
from three in 2006 to 24 in 2015. The campaigns are spread over the decade suggesting this was 
not an isolated phenomenon. Over the full sample, 30% of the campaigns contain confirmed 
allegations.10 Activists were the most accurate in 2010; 73% of the allegations have been 
confirmed. Activists’ lowest accuracy was in 2015 with only 8% of the allegations being 
confirmed. As it may take several years for the SEC to bring formal enforcement and for a SCA 
to conclude, the accuracy rate for 2014 and 2015 is likely understated. There are currently five 
(one) on-going SCAs regarding 2015 (2014) allegations, so activists’ accuracy will likely increase. 
Constraining the sample to campaigns through 2013 raises activists’ accuracy to 36%.11 
                                                 
10 31 cases resulted in a settled SCA, 8 in an AAER, and 8 in both settled SCA and an AAER. 
11 Inferences from multivariate analyses are similar if I constrain the sample to allegations made and SCAs filed by 
December 31, 2013 (untabulated). 
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Chapter 5: Research Design and Empirical Findings 
5.1 PREDICTIVE POWER OF ACTIVIST SHORT-SELLERS’ REPORTS  
5.1.1 Compustat population 
To examine the incremental predictive power of activists’ fraud allegations over other 
common fraud predictors, I estimate the following ordinary least square (OLS) regression for all 
firm-years with available data on Compustat and CRSP and fiscal years ending 2006-2015:12 
Conf. Fraudi,t = α0 + α1 Fraud Alleg.i,[t+1, t+2] + α2 Abn. Short Int.i,t + α3 F-scorei,t  
    + α4 Mod. Jonesi,t + α5 Abn. Aud. Feesi,t + αj Controlsi,t + ηj + δk + εi,t         (1) 
where i indexes firm and t indexes year. Conf. Fraud is an indicator variable set to one if 
firm i engaged in fraud, based on settled SCAs and AAERs, during year t and zero otherwise.  
The variable of interest is Fraud Alleg., which is an indicator variable set to one if an 
activist alleges, within 24 months following fiscal year end, that firm i committed fraud and zero 
otherwise.13 If the allegations are predictive of accounting fraud, then α1 should be positive and 
significant. In terms of other predictors, I include abnormal short interest (Karpoff and Lou 2010), 
the F-score by Dechow et al. (2011), modified Jones discretionary accruals, and abnormal audit 
fees (Price et al. 2011; Hribar et al. 2014). As abnormal short interest is calculated at the monthly 
level, I include the average value for the year. Controlsi,t is a vector of control variables identified 
to be associated with fraud commission (Erickson et al. 2006; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Donelson 
et al. 2017). I control for firm size (Log MVE), book to market (Book-to-Market), Big 4 auditor 
(Big 4), auditor tenure (Tenure), M&A activity (Acquisit.), internal control weaknesses (I/C 
                                                 
12 I use a linear probability model given concerns of potential bias arising from fixed effects when using nonlinear 
models (Greene 2004) especially for equations 2 and 5 that have a small number of observations. Inferences are 
similar using a logit model (untabulated). 
13 Inferences are similar if I use a 12- instead of a 24-month window (untabulated). I use 24 months given that the 
median fraud duration is about 2 years (see Karpoff and Lou 2010). 
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Weak.).14 I also control for profitability (ROA and Loss) as poorly performing firms are more likely 
to cook their books and leverage (Leverage and Financing Need) as distressed firms have higher 
incentives to commit fraud.15 δk represents Fama-French 12 (FF12) industry fixed effects to control 
for industry-wide factors and ηj represents year fixed effects to control for time-specific factors. 
5.1.2 Firms targeted by activists 
Firms with weaker corporate governance (e.g., firms employing a non-Big 4 auditor or 
experiencing internal control weaknesses) are more likely to be targeted by activists (Chen 2016; 
Zhao 2018). However, firms with weak corporate governance are also more likely to commit fraud. 
Thus, it could be that it is not the fraud allegation per se that potentially predicts fraud, but rather 
those firm characteristics. This would imply that firms targeted by activists with non-fraud 
allegations are just as likely to be committing fraud. Such a finding would suggest that the market 
should scrutinize all targets and not only firms specifically targeted with accounting fraud 
allegations. Further, following the release of activists’ reports, targeted firms receive high public 
scrutiny (Ljungqvist and Qian 2016). The additional scrutiny may help uncover any accounting 
fraud committed (i.e., even unrelated to the allegation). Thus, the predictive power may not stem 
from the allegation itself, but from the additional scrutiny. 
To address these issues, I examine a sample of firms that have been targeted by activists 
either for 1) accounting fraud or 2) other reasons unrelated to accounting fraud (non-fraud 
allegations) such as overvaluation etc. I concentrate on campaigns included in AI to ensure that all 
allegations are made by prominent activists and thus attract market participants’ attention. As 
                                                 
14 Not all firms are required to have their auditors provide an opinion on the effectiveness of their internal controls. 
To avoid losing those observations, I set I/C Weak. equal to 0 and No I/C Opinion equal to 1. This approach is 
similar in nature to how prior studies treated firms with missing R&D (Koh & Reeb 2015). 
15 I do not control for governance characteristics as activists target small firms for which data is not easily 
accessible. 
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activists may initiate multiple non-fraud campaigns against a firm, I only keep the first per fiscal 
year. If during a year, activists target a firm both with fraud and non-fraud allegations, I exclude 
the non-fraud campaign. After identifying firms at the campaign level, I then examine the two 
firm-years prior to the campaign (i.e., when the fraud was likely committed) and re-estimate 
equation 1. If fraud allegations provide additional predictive power over and above simply being 
a target, then α1 should be positive and significant. 
5.1.3 Results 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics comparing years in which a firm is 
predicted of having engaged in accounting fraud based on activists’ fraud allegations to the rest of 
the Compustat population. Descriptively, accused firm-years are more likely to be fraudulent (p < 
0.01). These firm-years also rank high on other variables predicting fraud such as abnormal short 
interest (Abn. Short Int.) and F-score (F-score) (p < 0.01). The short interest cannot be driven by 
the campaign itself as I examine years prior to the first allegation. Interestingly, these firms have 
lower abnormal audit fees (Abn. Aud. Fees) (p < 0.01). In terms of other firm characteristics, these 
firms are more profitable (ROA and Loss), less levered (Leverage), more likely to be involved in 
M&A (Acquisit.) and have internal control weaknesses (I/C Weak.), less likely to employ a Big 4 
auditor (Big 4), receive an internal control opinion from their auditors (No I/C Opinion) and have 
a shorter auditor tenure (Tenure) (p < 0.05) consistent with prior findings (Chen 2016; Zhao 2018). 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. Firms with higher abnormal short 
interest, F-score, and abnormal audit fees are more likely to commit accounting fraud (p < 0.01). 
Interestingly, the correlation between Fraud and accruals (Mod. Jones) is low and significantly 
negative (p < 0.05). The remaining correlations are consistent with prior research; for example, 
firms experiencing a loss year, making an acquisition, having internal control weaknesses, and 
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employing a non-Big 4 auditor are more likely to commit fraud (p < 0.10) (Lennox and Pittman 
2010).  
Table 4 presents results from equation 1 examining the predictive power of activists’ fraud 
allegations. Column 1 of Table 4 presents results using the Compustat population as the reference 
group. The coefficient on Fraud Alleg. is positive and significant (p < 0.01) suggesting that 
activists provide incremental predictive power over other commonly used fraud predictors in 
identifying firms committing fraud. The probability a firm has committed fraud increases by 22 
percentage points if an activist alleges so. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in 
abnormal short interest (F-score) increases the probability of a firm having committed fraud by 0.5 
(0.6) percentage points (p < 0.01) (untabulated). Modified Jones discretionary accruals and 
abnormal audit fees provide no additional predictive power.  
I next replace the continuous variables with indicator variables set to one if the firm is 
ranked among the top 1% of that predictor in a given year for two reasons. First, this approach 
classifies only the most egregious cases identified by each measure as potentially fraudulent. Thus, 
it provides the other predictors their best chance to outperform activists and thus take away its 
predictive power. Second, the SEC has limited resources, and it is likely that it will go after cases 
where a firm is very likely to be committing fraud as suggested by the predictors. Thus, this 
approach, in a sense, evaluates how cost efficient it would be for the SEC to follow up on the most 
extreme cases of each predictor. 
Column 2 of Table 4 presents results. The coefficient on Fraud Alleg. remains positive and 
significant (p < 0.01). Further, the coefficient is significantly larger than the coefficients of the 
remaining predictors (p < 0.01). Thus, activists provide the most accurate signal that a firm has 
committed fraud. 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present results from equation 1 using all campaigns, both fraud 
and non-fraud, covered by Activist Insights. The coefficient on Fraud Alleg. remains positive and 
significant under both specifications (p < 0.01) suggesting that fraud allegations provide 
incremental predictive power over and above simply being, in general, the target of an activist. 
The coefficients for the remaining predictors are mostly insignificant. Abnormal short interest and 
abnormal audit fees are significant with an opposite than expected sign (p < 0.10). 
Panel B of Table 4 presents information regarding precision (e.g., the percent of firm-years 
correctly predicted to be fraudulent) and type II error rates (e.g., the percent of fraudulent firm-
years classified as non-fraudulent). I compare firm-years flagged using activists’ fraud allegations 
to firm-years identified using the extreme values (top 1%) of the other predictors. Activists’ 
allegations have the highest precision rate and lowest type II error rate.16 If the SEC were to 
investigate firm-years flagged as potentially fraudulent based on extreme values of F-score 
(abnormal short interest) [abnormal audit fees], the agency would identify 5 (7) [7] fraudulent 
firm-years for every 100 investigated. On the other hand, the agency would identify 25 firm-years 
for every 100 investigated based on activists’ allegations. Thus, in terms of resource allocation, 
regulators and investors are better off concentrating on activists’ allegations.  
Overall, Table 4 provides evidence consistent with activists’ accounting fraud allegations 
providing additional predictive power in identifying firms committing fraud after controlling for 
multiple other commonly used fraud predictors. Activists’ allegations actually provide the 
strongest signal among the predictors examined in this study. Other whistleblowers, such as 
employees, analysts, and the media, may be more accurate and thus provide a stronger signal, but 
it is unlikely that they will affect the predictive power of activists allegations. That is because 
                                                 
16 In contrast to activists’ allegations, type II errors for the other predictors can be decreased by relaxing the 
requirement of top 1% to top 5% or 10% etc. However, doing so will substantially decrease their precision rate. 
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although firms targeted by activists may exhibit high F-score etc., they are not targeted by other 
whistleblowers prior to activists (see Figure 1 for some evidence). 
5.2 COSTS OF UNCONFIRMED FRAUD ALLEGATIONS TO TARGETED FIRMS 
5.2.1 Reaction from the SEC and attorneys 
Out of the 159 campaigns in my sample where activists alleged fraud, attorneys 
investigated whether to file a SCA or the SEC opened an investigation in 90 (57%) cases.17 After 
excluding cases for which no SCA was filed, the SEC investigated or attorneys actually filed a 
SCA for 69 (43%) campaigns. By the end, only 30% of the campaigns have a final decision that 
confirms fraud commission. Thus, lawyers and the SEC respond even to ‘inaccurate’ allegations 
suggesting that costs may be imposed on those firms. 
5.2.2 Costs of unconfirmed fraud allegations 
To examine costs imposed by unconfirmed fraud allegations, I switch from examining 
firm-years on Compustat to examining all campaigns covered by AI. I perform a difference-in-
differences analysis and examine the two years prior to the two years following the initial report 
of each campaign. The control group consists of campaigns covered by AI in which activists make 
non-fraud allegations (e.g., overvaluation). Thus, any differential change in non-meritorious 
litigation risk, audit fees, and earnings can be attributed to the fraud allegation.18 I exclude 
confirmed fraud allegations because the primary interest in this section is costs imposed by 
unconfirmed allegations.  
                                                 
17 The disclosure of an SEC investigation is not mandatory (Stuart and Wilson 2009). Thus, the response rate may 
be understated. Further, it should be noted that, in some cases, the firm does not provide enough information as to 
what the SEC is investigating and thus a judgment call is needed to decide whether it relates to activists’ allegations. 
18 Using any other group of firms as the control sample would allow for changes to be driven by the activist 
campaign rather than the fraud allegation. 
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To examine changes in non-meritorious litigation risk, I estimate the following OLS 
regression: 
Dism. SCAi,t = β0 + β1Posti,t + β2Post x Fraud Campaigni,t + βjControlsi,t-1 + θj + ηk + εi,t  (2) 
Dism. SCA is an indicator variable set to one if firm i gets sued in year t and the SCA gets 
dismissed and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable set to one for the two years following 
each campaign and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is Post x Fraud Campaign which is an 
indicator variable set to one for the two years following an accounting fraud allegation and zero 
otherwise. If unconfirmed fraud allegations increase the risk of targeted firms facing non-
meritorious litigation, then β2 should be positive and significant. 
Controlsi,t-1 represents a vector of control variables identified to affect litigation risk such 
as size (Log MVE), sales growth (Sales Growth), return (Return), return volatility (Volatility), and 
shares turnover (Turnover) (see Kim and Skinner 2012). θj represents firm fixed effects and ηk 
represents year fixed effects. I also include Fraud Campaign as some firms are targeted both with 
fraud and non-fraud allegations. I do not control for high litigation risk industries (Francis et al. 
1994) as the variable is subsumed by firm fixed effects. 
To examine whether audit fees increase following unconfirmed fraud allegations, I 
estimate the following OLS regression: 
Log Feesi,t = γ0 + γ1Posti,t + γ2Post x Fraud Campaigni,t + γjControlsi,t + θj + ηk + εi,t              (3) 
Log Fees represents the natural logarithm of audit fees. The variable of interest is Post x 
Fraud Campaign. If unconfirmed fraud allegations result in higher audit fees, then γ2 should be 
positive and significant. Controlsi,t is a vector of controls identified to be associated with audit 
pricing (DeFond et al. 2002; Hribar et al. 2014; Keune et al. 2016). I control for firm complexity 
and audit risk by including controls for size (Log MVE), leverage (Leverage), current ratio (CR), 
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foreign operations (For. Oper.), profitability (ROA and Loss), M&A activity (Acquisit.), 
intangibles (Intang.), the ratio of receivables and inventory to total assets (Inv. & Receiv.), and 
cash flows (CashFlow). I also control for Big 4 (Big 4), auditor tenure (Tenure), and whether the 
firm did not receive a qualified opinion (Opinion) as other types require additional audit effort and 
thus higher audit fees. θj represents firm fixed effects and ηk represents year fixed effects. 
Finally, to examine whether costs imposed by unconfirmed fraud allegations are large 
enough to affect overall firm performance, I estimate the following OLS regression: 
Earningsi,t = ζ0 + ζ1 Posti,t + ζ2 Post x Fraud Campaigni,t + ζj Controlsi,t-1 + θj + ηk + εi,t       (4) 
Earnings represents income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. If costs 
imposed by unconfirmed allegations are large enough to affect earnings, then ζ2 should be negative 
and significant. Controlsi,t-1 represents a vector of controls used by prior research (Donelson et al. 
2018; Curtis et al. 2018). I control for prior year’s earnings (Earnings) as earnings are persistent, 
negative earnings (Loss) as losses also tend to be persistent, M&A activity (Acquisit.) to control 
for expansion opportunities, leverage (Leverage) and SG&A (SG&A). θj represents firm fixed 
effects and ηk represents year fixed effects. 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics that compare changes for treated (i.e., firms targeted 
with unconfirmed fraud allegations) and control (i.e., firms targeted with non-fraud allegations) 
firms.19 Treated firms experience an increase in non-meritorious litigation risk (p < 0.01). Both 
groups experience an increase in audit fees (p < 0.05), but treated firms experience a greater 
increase (p < 0.10 one-tail test). Further, both groups experience insignificant changes in earnings 
(p > 0.10). In terms of controls, although both groups experience changes in several variables, the 
                                                 
19 Equations 2-4 require data for different variables and as such there is a fluctuation in sample size. 
 26 
difference-in-differences changes are insignificant for all variables (p > 0.10) other than for 
Acquisit.t-1 for the earnings test, which increases more for treated firms (p < 0.05).  
Table 6 presents results regarding costs imposed by unconfirmed fraud allegations on 
targeted firms. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 present results from equation 2 examining the effect 
of unconfirmed allegations on targeted firms’ non-meritorious litigation risk. Column 1 presents 
results of a basic specification with only fixed effects and column 2 includes all control variables. 
The coefficient on Post is insignificant under both specifications suggesting that non-meritorious 
litigation risk does not change for the control firms. In contrast, the coefficient on Post x Fraud 
Campaign is positive and significant (p < 0.01) suggesting an increase of 9 percentage points in 
non-meritorious litigation risk for firms targeted with unconfirmed fraud allegations.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 present results from equation 3 examining the effect of 
unconfirmed fraud allegations on audit fees. Column 3 presents results with only fixed effects and 
column 4 includes all control variables. The coefficient on Post x Fraud Campaign is positive and 
significant (p < 0.05) indicating that audit fees increase by about 15-17% for firms facing 
unconfirmed fraud allegations.20 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present results from equation 4 examining the effect of 
unconfirmed allegations on targeted firms’ earnings. Column 5 presents results with only fixed 
effects and column 6 includes all control variables. The coefficients on Post x Fraud Campaign 
are insignificant (p > 0.10) and thus fail to reject the null that activists’ unconfirmed fraud 
allegations do not affect a firm’s profitability. Therefore, while unconfirmed fraud allegations do 
impose certain costs, the costs are not significant enough to affect earnings. 
                                                 
20 Calculated as 100(exp(0.16)-1) and 100(exp(0.14)-1). 
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The central assumption to a causal interpretation from the difference-in-differences 
analyses is that the treated and control groups shared parallel trends prior to the campaigns. To 
provide evidence that the parallel trend assumption is valid, Figure 2 depicts the counterfactual 
treatment effect on a yearly basis relative to the allegation. If the parallel trend assumption is valid, 
then the treatment effect should be close to zero in the pre-period and experience a change in the 
post-period (see Christensen et al. 2017). I use the first year prior to the allegation as the benchmark 
year against which the remaining yearly effects are compared. The figures suggest that the increase 
in non-meritorious litigation risk and audit fees takes place following the campaigns. For 
completeness, I also plot earnings. While the increase in audit fees lasts for at least two years 
(Figure 2b), the increase in non-meritorious litigation risk is concentrated in year 1 (Figure 2a). 
Table 6 and Figure 2 present results consistent with firms facing some costs due to unconfirmed 
fraud allegations, but these costs are not large enough to affect earnings. 
5.3 OVERALL IMPACT ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
I next examine 514 accounting related SCAs alleging a Rule 10b-5 violation filed between 
2006 and 2015 for which an outcome is known (i.e., I exclude on-going cases). About 12% of 
these SCAs contain allegations similar to those raised by activists or directly name them in the 
complaint. To study the impact of activists’ fraud allegations on the legal system, I estimate the 
following OLS regression: 
SCA Outcomei = λ0 + λ1 Activist Casei + λj Controlsi + ηj + δk + εi                     (5) 
SCA Outcome represents one of the following three variables. First, I examine whether a 
case settles (Settled). Second, I examine whether a case settles for more than $1M (Settled (> 
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$1M)) as cases settling for less may be nuisance cases (Skinner 1997; Choi et al. 2009; Dyck et al. 
2010).21 Third, I examine settlement amounts (Log Settlement). 
Activist Case is an indicator variable set to one if the complaint contains allegations similar 
to the ones raised by the activist or specifically names the activist in the complaint and zero 
otherwise.22 If these cases are more meritorious, relative to the population of SCAs, then λ1 should 
be positive and significant. However, if these cases have lower merits due to false allegations, then 
λ1 should be negative and significant. Controlsi represents a vector of control variables regarding 
case merits (Donelson et al. 2018). Among others, I control for maximum potential damages 
(Maximum Damages), restatements (Restatement), law firm quality (Top 5 Law Firm), and SEC 
enforcement actions (SEC Enforcement). δk represents FF12 industry fixed effects and ηj represents 
year fixed effects. 
Table 7 presents results from equation 5. The coefficient on Activist Case is positive and 
significant under all specifications (p < 0.05) suggesting that these cases have a 19 (22) percentage 
point higher probability of settling (for over $1M) and receive larger settlements. Thus, from the 
legal system’s perspective, activists’ allegations improve resource allocation. 
Table 7 shows that activists’ allegations improve the legal system’s efficacy, while Table 
6 finds that firms facing unconfirmed allegations experience an increase in non-meritorious 
litigation risk. The key distinction is that the analysis for Table 7 is conditioned on a SCA being 
                                                 
21 Skinner (1997) used $1M, Choi et al. (2009) used $2M, and Dyck et al. (2010) used $3M. I use $1M given that 
many allegations are against smaller firms and settlements larger than $1M should be significant to them. An 
alternative would be to use a cut-off based on the ratio of settlement amount relative to the market value of the firm. 
Choi et al. (2009) use 0.5% of market cap measured 10 days prior to class period end. Rather than using market cap 
prior to fraud period end (at which point the firm was overvalued), I use market value just after class period end 
which better captures the true size of the firm. Inferences remain similar (untabulated). 
22 Although the fraud sample used in this study should be quite comprehensive in identifying SCAs including 
allegations similar to those of activists, it is possible it misses some. As such, I perform textual analysis for cases 
listed on Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and identify SCAs naming major activists in the complaint. 
I then read the relevant cases and if the activist’s allegation is accounting related, I reclassify the SCA to be activist 
related (i.e., Activist Case is set to one). I identify six such cases. Three cases settled and three were dismissed.  
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filed. Overall, 70% of activists’ fraud campaigns contain unconfirmed allegations, and 14% of 
those firms later face a SCA that gets dismissed. Based on Compustat population, the probability 
that a firm will face a non-meritorious SCA in a given year is less than 1% (untabulated). Thus, 
unconfirmed fraud allegations increase non-meritorious litigation risk. However, conditioned on a 
SCA filing, about 69% of SCAs with allegations similar to those of activists settle. On average, 
only 60% of the remaining accounting related SCAs settle. Thus, SCAs with allegations similar to 
those of activists are more likely to settle. 
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Chapter 6: Additional Analysis 
6.1 MARKET REACTION 
Thus far, the paper has examined the predictive power of activists’ fraud allegations, costs 
of unconfirmed allegations to targeted firms, and the overall effect of activists’ allegations on the 
legal system. In this section, I examine shareholders’ reaction. One would expect a negative market 
reaction to the release of these reports, but the extent of the reaction and for how long the negative 
reaction lasts for firms facing unconfirmed fraud allegations is unclear. To examine market 
reaction, I concentrate on all reports included in AI (i.e., not simply the initial report of each 
campaign) as subsequent reports from the same activist or reports from different activists may 
further affect the market. 
Figure 3 presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the 252-trading days 
following the report release day. Figure 3a (3b) compares reports with confirmed fraud allegations 
(non-fraud allegations) to reports with unconfirmed fraud allegations. The shaded area around each 
line represents a 95 percent confidence interval.  
Concentrating on days 0 and 1 following the publication of the reports, the BHAR for 
reports containing unconfirmed allegations is -5.8% (-7.6% concentrating on the initial report of 
each campaign) (untabulated). This implies that an investor buying shares just prior to the release 
of these reports and selling the following day, as a result of the allegations, experiences significant 
losses. The BHAR for reports containing non-fraud allegations (confirmed fraud allegations) is -
4.7% (-12.8%) (untabulated). The returns for unconfirmed fraud allegations and non-fraud 
allegations are not statistically different (p > 0.10), while returns for confirmed fraud allegations 
are significantly more negative than both other types of reports (p < 0.01) (untabulated). Thus, the 
market reacts negatively to all reports, as expected, but reacts stronger to reports containing fraud 
allegations that will ultimately be confirmed. 
 31 
In terms of long-window returns, reports containing confirmed fraud allegations continue 
to exhibit the most negative BHAR throughout the period. Similarly, reports containing non-fraud 
allegations exhibit negative returns over the whole period. However, the pattern differs for reports 
containing unconfirmed fraud allegations. The market continues to react negatively to those reports 
over the following 60 days at which point the price starts to recover. By day 88 the BHAR is not 
significantly different from 0 (p < 0.05) and by the end of the period reports containing 
unconfirmed fraud allegations exhibit the highest returns, relative to reports containing non-fraud 
and confirmed fraud allegations (p < 0.05) (untabulated). Inferences for the 2-day and 252-day 
BHAR remain the same in a multivariate analysis controlling for firm size, volatility prior to the 
allegation, analyst coverage, book-to-market, and year and industry fixed effects (untabulated).  
 Although the BHAR pattern in the short-run is similar for reports containing 
unconfirmed fraud allegations and non-fraud allegations, changes in information asymmetry may 
vary across the two groups. To examine information asymmetry, I estimate the following OLS 
regression: 
ΔSpreadi = μ0 + μ1 Fraud Reporti + μj Controlsi + δk + ηj + εi                  (6) 
ΔSpread is the average spread for a given window following the fraud allegation less the 
average spread for a similar window prior to the allegation (Lee 2016). I examine four windows 
(20-, 40-, 90-, and 180-trading days post-report publication). Fraud Report is an indicator variable 
set to one if the report contains unconfirmed fraud allegations and zero if it contains non-fraud 
allegations. I control for size (Log MVE 1), turnover (Turnover 1), price (Log Price), and return 
volatility (Volatility 1), all calculated on the last trading day prior to the report’s publication as 
well as book to market (Book-to-Market) as of the most recent fiscal year end. δk represents FF12 
industry fixed effects and ηj represents year fixed effects.  
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Table 8 presents results from equation 6. Firms targeted with unconfirmed fraud allegations 
experience a larger change in bid-ask spread relative to firms targeted with non-fraud allegations 
for the 20-, 40-, and 90-trading day windows (p < 0.10), but not for the 180-trading day window.23 
This suggests a temporary increase in information asymmetry. Overall this section shows that 
unconfirmed fraud allegations temporarily distort capital markets. 
6.2 PREDICTIVE POWER USING DIFFERENT PROXIES FOR FRAUD COMMISSION 
In section 5.1, I define Conf. Fraud using settled SCAs and AAERs. However, prior studies 
suggest that SCAs that settle for a relatively small amount may be considered nuisance cases. To 
address concerns that the results are driven by nuisance cases, I re-estimate equation 1 using two 
alternative definitions of Conf. Fraud. First, I define Conf. Fraud using SCAs that settle for more 
than $1M (Skinner 1997) and AAERs. Second, I define Conf. Fraud using only AAERs.  
Table 9 presents results under the alternative definitions for Conf. Fraud. Under all 
specifications Fraud Alleg. remains positive and significant (p < 0.10). Although the coefficients 
for Fraud Alleg. when using only AAERs to define Conf. Fraud appear to be of lower magnitude 
when compared to the coefficients in Table 4 and columns 1-4 in Table 9, the percent increase 
from the baseline probability of fraud is actually larger. The baseline probability of fraud when 
using only AAERs to define fraud is 0.3% vs 1.5% when using both SCAs and AAERs. As such 
a firm is about 20 (15) times more likely to face an SEC enforcement action (SEC enforcement 
action or settled SCA) if an activist alleges accounting fraud. 
                                                 
23 An alternative specification would be to compare the change in the average bid-ask spread for the 20 days prior to 
the issuance of the report to the average bid-ask spread for days 1) 0-20, 2) 21-40, 3) 41-90, and 4) 91-180 following 
the issuance of the report. Under this specification, information asymmetry is higher for days 0-20 and 21-40 
following the issuance of the reports (p < 0.10) (untabulated). 
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6.3 FRAUD COMMITTED BY FIRMS LISTED IN THE US THROUGH REVERSE MERGERS 
Over the prior decade, many Chinese firms listed in the US through a reverse merger (RM 
firms) engaged in accounting fraud. In response, in 2011, the SEC warned investors against 
investing in these firms (Lee et al. 2015). Activists were credited for exposing many of these frauds 
(Lee et al. 2015; Chen 2016). About 31% of the campaigns in my sample are against RM firms. 
This wave of fraud cases, however, represents a setting that may not generalize to other settings 
for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that a similar fraud will re-occur as the public and the SEC are 
now aware of risk associated with these firms. Second, some methods employed to uncover these 
frauds cannot be easily adapted to other settings. In addition to comparing ratios to peer firms, 
activists compared SEC to SAIC filings (filings with the Chinese authorities) and visited physical 
locations to verify plant existence and production levels. A more ‘traditional’ accounting fraud 
cannot be detected in such a way. In this section, I examine the extent to which inferences from 
the prior analyses may have been driven by campaigns against RM firms. I modify equations 1-6 
to distinguish between fraud allegations made against RM and traditional firms.  
Table 10 descriptively examines whether attorneys and the SEC reacted differently to fraud 
allegations against RM (Panel A) and traditional (Panel B) firms as well as differences in accuracy 
rates. Out of 50 campaigns against RM firms, attorneys evaluated whether to file a SCA or the 
SEC investigated 36 and 24 (48%) campaigns have been confirmed. However, only 22% of 
campaigns against traditional firms have been confirmed. A mean difference test indicates that 
cases against RM firms were more likely to be confirmed (p < 0.01). 
Panel A of Table 11 presents results from modified equation 1. Under all specifications, 
activists provide the strongest signal that a firm has committed fraud both for traditional and 
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reverse merger firms (p < 0.01). The coefficient for fraud allegations against RM firms is 
statistically larger for all columns (p < 0.10 one-tail test).24  
Panel B of Table 11 presents results from modified equations 2-4 examining costs from 
unconfirmed fraud allegations. Column 1 examines changes in non-meritorious litigation risk and 
indicates that it increases by 11 percentage points for traditional firms (p < 0.01). Column 2 
examines audit fees and indicates that only RM firms experience an increase in audit fees (p < 
0.05). Column 3 examines the effect on earnings. Both coefficients of interest are insignificant 
suggesting that costs incurred from these allegations are not large enough to impact the 
profitability of either group of firms.  
Panel C of Table 11 presents results from modified equation 5. The results suggest that 
activists’ allegations against RM firms helped increase the legal system’s efficacy as those cases 
were more likely to settle (p < 0.01). In contrast, Activist Case – Traditional is insignificant under 
all specifications (p > 0.10). Panel D of Table 10 presents results from modified equation 6 
examining changes in information asymmetry. The results suggest that information asymmetry 
increases only for traditional firms (Fraud Report – Traditional) for the 20- and 40-day window 
following the release of activists’ reports (p < 0.05).  
Overall, Tables 10 and 11 show that results from prior analyses are for the most part not 
driven by allegations against RM firms. However, activists were better at identifying fraud 
committed by reverse mergers, while the costs from unconfirmed allegations appear to be larger 
for traditionally listed firms.  
                                                 
24 In untabulated analysis, I note that estimating modified equation 1 without including the other predictors, which 
induce a large sample attrition, results in allegations against RM firms having significantly higher predictive power 
at p < 0.01 one-tail test.  
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6.4 ACCURACY RATES IN PRIOR STUDIES 
The results of this paper contradict findings of prior studies to some extent. For instance, 
Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) note “Investigation by regulators such as the SEC or the DoJ or by an 
exchange back up the reports in fully 90% of the cases” (p. 2008).25  The difference is attributed 
to different design choices and interpretations of findings. 
First, concentrating on SEC actions and SCAs, I consider a campaign to contain confirmed 
allegations if the SCA settles or the SEC issues an AAER. Ljungqvist and Qian (2016), however, 
also consider SEC investigations that do not result in an AAER and dismissed SCAs. Nevertheless, 
there is a difference between a) rationally following up on a report and b) confirming the 
allegations in the report. Activists are good at identifying fraud, so it is rational for the SEC to 
follow up on these allegations. However, investigations that do not result in the issuance of an 
AAER cannot be considered events confirming the allegations. 
Second, a firm can be sued or face an SEC enforcement action for reasons unrelated to 
those raised by activists. In this study, I ensure that the allegations are similar. However, 
Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) appear to consider all subsequent investigations and lawsuits as 
confirmatory events. As per Table 7 of Ljungqvist and Qian (2016), the lag between the initial 
report and the ‘confirmatory’ action is 845 days at the 75th percentile for “Class-action lawsuit”. It 
is unclear whether the allegations in these SCAs are similar to those raised by activists.  
Third, I do not consider delistings as confirming activists’ reports. In my sample, there are 
84 firms that eventually delist following the allegation. Out of those delistings, only 34 overlap 
with the confirmed fraud sample. Table 12 tabulates the reasons for the delisting as provided by 
CRSP for unconfirmed allegations. Out of the 50 campaigns, 27 do so due to M&A activity. 
                                                 
25 The sample composition of the two studies differ. Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) include all activists’ campaigns 
and not only cases alleging accounting fraud and include reports issued between July 2006 and December 2011. 
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Another five firms get delisted at least three years after the initial report because the company: a) 
went bankrupt, b) requested to get delisted, or c) had insufficient capital. The long gap, without 
any further examination, makes it difficult to assess the accuracy of activists’ allegations. The 
category that potentially suggests fraud is Protection of Investors. For these cases, the exchange 
delists the firm because of concerns that the firm is defrauding the public. There are three such 
cases. Attorneys or the SEC followed up on all three; a SCA was filed for two, but later got 
dismissed. Table 12 suggests that, overall, these cases do not look like fraud.  
6.5 RESTATEMENTS 
Several papers include restatements as a proxy for fraud (Desai et al. 2006a; Hobson et al. 
2012; Masulis et al. 2012). Although restatements represent violations of U.S. GAAP, they are not 
indicative of fraud as they do not require the element of intent. However, it is possible that activists 
identify GAAP violations, but wrongly conclude fraud. I identify 22 major restatements (see Tan 
and Young 2015) for which the reasoning for the restatement is similar to activists’ allegations. 
Out of the 22 campaigns, 16 are classified as confirmed fraud cases. From the remaining 
campaigns, attorneys or the SEC evaluated two, but in the end the allegations were not verified. 
There is one on-going SCA. Thus, most restatements are already identified as confirmed cases, but 
potential exaggerations impose costs on some of these firms. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This paper examines the predictive power of activists’ accounting fraud allegations and 
costs imposed by unconfirmed allegations. Activists’ accounting fraud allegations provide 
incremental predictive power in identifying firms committing fraud after controlling for many 
other commonly used fraud predictors. Activists actually provide the most accurate signal that a 
firm has committed fraud among the predictors examined in this study. However, many of the 
allegations (about 70%) are not later confirmed. These unconfirmed allegations impose costs on 
targeted firms as they increase non-meritorious litigation risk and audit fees, but the costs are not 
large enough to affect profitability. In examining the effect of activists’ fraud allegations on the 
legal system, I find that SCAs containing allegations similar to those raised by activists are more 
likely to settle. Unconfirmed fraud allegations temporarily negatively affect capital markets as they 
depress prices and increase information asymmetry. Activists were more accurate with allegations 
made against firms listed in the US through a reverse merger.  
The results of this study should be of interest to regulators in the U.S. and around the world 
who are concerned with false rumors spreading the market. Although the study cannot conclude 
whether overall the benefits provided by confirmed allegations outweigh the costs imposed by 
unconfirmed allegations as it is difficult to monetize them, the study provides some insights into 
those benefits and costs. Further, this study contributes to the stream of literature examining short-
sellers as external corporate governance mechanisms. This study shows that activists, although 
quite accurate in their allegations, also make a lot of ‘inaccurate’ allegations which impose some 
costs on targeted firms and those firms’ shareholders. The findings validate executives’ concerns 
that many of the allegations are inaccurate. Further, the findings suggest that a type of external 
monitor which, in the past, did not participate in uncovering fraud, has recently become a very 
important source of fraud identification.   
 38 
Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Accounting fraud allegations by activists 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics regarding sample composition. The sample consists of 
accounting fraud allegations by activist short-sellers for the period 2006 to 2015. Fraud 
allegations have been identified using: 1) Activist Insights, 2) SeekingAlpha, and 3) major 
activists’ websites. Panel B presents descriptive statistics regarding the total number of 
campaigns individual activists participate in. 
Panel A: Sample Composition       
    N 
Unique campaigns by activists    159 
Unique firms targeted by activists    151 
Unique activists    88 
      
Panel B: Number of campaigns covered 
     
# of Campaigns Covered:  # Activists  
Total # of 
Campaigns Covered 
1  58  58 
2  9  18 
3  4  12 
4 or More  17  135 
  88   
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Table 2: Frequency of confirmed fraud allegations  
This table tabulates the number of activists’ accounting fraud campaigns identified per 
calendar year (Total Campaigns), the number of campaigns with confirmed fraud 
allegations (Frequency of Confirmed Allegations), and the percent of cases with confirmed 
allegations (%). A campaign is classified as containing confirmed allegations if 
subsequently there was a settled securities class action (SCA) with a Rule 10b-5/Section 
10(b) violation or an AAER with a Rule 10b-5/Section 10(b) violation and the SCA/AAER 
contains allegations similar to those alleged by the activist (or directly refers to them). 
Year  
Total 
Campaigns  
Frequency of 
Confirmed Allegations   % 
2006  3  2  67% 
2007  3  1  33% 
2008  7  3  43% 
2009  6  1  17% 
2010  15  11  73% 
2011  43  15  35% 
2012  13  2  15% 
2013  22  4  18% 
2014  23  6  26% 
2015  24  2  8% 
Overall  159  47  30% 
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Table 3: Predictive power - Descriptive statistics  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analyses examining the 
predictive power of activists’ fraud allegations. The sample includes all firm-years, for the period 
2006-2015, with available data on Compustat and CRSP. Fraud Alleg. is an indicator variable set to 
one if over the 24 months following fiscal year end, an activist accuses the firm of committing 
accounting fraud. Bolded values indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level. Panel B 
presents Pearson correlations. Bolded values indicate statistical significance at 5 percent level. To 
minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent 
levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 Fraud Alleg. = 0  Fraud Alleg. = 1   
 Firm-Years  Mean  Firm-Years  Mean  Diff. 
Conf. Fraud 33,306  0.014  193  0.249  0.235 
Abn. Short Int. 33,306  -0.001  193  0.027  0.028 
F-score 33,306  0.921  193  1.234  0.314 
Mod. Jones 33,306  0.179  193  0.184  0.005 
Abn. Aud. Fees 33,306  0.011  193  -0.135  -0.145 
I/C Weak. 33,306  0.045  193  0.171  0.126 
No I/C Opinion 33,306  0.211  193  0.269  0.059 
Log MVE 33,306  6.409  193  6.294  -0.115 
Book-to-Market 33,306  0.605  193  0.537  -0.069 
ROA 33,306  -0.031  193  0.023  0.054 
Loss 33,306  0.332  193  0.269  -0.062 
Leverage 33,306  0.215  193  0.153  -0.062 
Financing Need 33,306  0.088  193  0.093  0.005 
Big 4 33,306  0.743  193  0.518  -0.225 
Tenure 33,306  1.969  193  1.461  -0.508 
Acquisit. 33,306  0.387  193  0.466  0.079 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Pearson correlations        
   
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Conf. Fraud 1                
(2) Fraud Alleg. 0.15 1               
(3) Abn. Short Int. 0.06 0.04 1              
(4) F-score 0.05 0.04 0.00 1             
(5) Mod. Jones -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 1            
(6) Abn. Aud. Fees 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 1           
(7) I/C Weak. 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.11 1          
(8) No I/C Opinion -0.02 0.01 -0.14 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.11 1         
(9) Log MVE 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.59 1        
(10) Book-to-Market 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.15 -0.27 1       
(11) ROA 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.24 0.39 0.03 1      
(12) Loss 0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 0.04 0.06 0.24 -0.42 0.10 -0.63 1     
(13) Leverage -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.11 -0.13 -0.08 0.06 1    
(14) Financing Need 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.18 -0.02 -0.48 0.30 0.12 1   
(15) Big 4 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.46 0.53 -0.12 0.16 -0.17 0.12 -0.11 1  
(16) Tenure -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.26 0.30 -0.08 0.13 -0.17 0.03 -0.10 0.33 1 
(17) Acquisit. 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.29 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.20 0.28 -0.05 0.16 -0.17 0.06 -0.17 0.16 0.10 
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Table 4: Predictive power of fraud allegations by activist short-sellers     
Panel A presents results from equation 1 examining the predictive power of activists’ fraud allegations. Columns 1 and 
2 present results examining all firm-years, for the period 2006-2015, with available data on Compustat and CRSP. 
Columns 3 and 4 focus on all campaigns covered by Activist Insights and examine whether the fraud allegations 
provide additional predictive power over and above simply being the target of an activist. Panel B presents information 
regarding precision and type II error rates for Fraud Alleg. and the remaining predictors. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses and are clustered by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), 
respectively. To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent 
levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
Panel A: Predictive power                 
  Compustat Population  Activist Insights 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  Conf. Fraud  Conf. Fraud  Conf. Fraud  Conf. Fraud 
Fraud Alleg.  0.22***  0.22***  0.18***  0.19*** 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.046) 
Abn. Short Int.  0.12***    -0.18   
  (0.031)    (0.119)   
F-score  0.01***    -0.00*   
  (0.002)    (0.000)   
Mod. Jones  -0.00    0.01   
  (0.002)    (0.010)   
Abn. Aud. Fees  0.00    -0.05*   
  (0.002)    (0.027)   
Top 1% - Abn. Short Int.    0.04**    -0.07** 
    (0.021)    (0.033) 
Top 1% - F-score    0.03**    0.03 
    (0.012)    (0.103) 
Top 1% - Mod. Jones    -0.00    0.18 
    (0.006)    (0.159) 
Top 1% - Abn. Aud. Fees    0.04***    -0.13** 
    (0.013)    (0.049) 
I/C Weak.  0.07***  0.07***  0.13**  0.12* 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.060)  (0.061) 
No I/C Opinion  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.04 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Log MVE  0.00***  0.00***  0.01  0.01 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Book-to-Market  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
ROA  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Loss  0.01***  0.01***  0.02  0.02 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Leverage  -0.01  -0.00  -0.07  -0.05 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Financing Need 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
Big 4  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Tenure  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00  -0.01 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
Acquisit.  -0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.031)  (0.031)          
Observations  33,499  33,499  608  608 
R-squared  0.047  0.046  0.213  0.211 
Year and FF12 FE   YES   YES   YES   YES 
 
Panel B: Precision rate and Type II error rate      
  
Conf. 
Fraud = 1   
Conf. 
Fraud = 0  Precision    Type II error 
Fraud Alleg.:       
    Indicator = 1  48  145  24.9%   
    Indicator =0  452  32,854    90.4% 
         
Top 1% - Abn. Short Int.         
    Indicator = 1  23  309  6.9%   
    Indicator = 0  477  32,690    95.4% 
 
 
       
Top 1% - F-score         
    Indicator = 1  17  315  5.1%   
    Indicator = 0  483  32,684    96.6% 
         
Top 1% - Mod. Jones         
    Indicator = 1  5  327  1.5%   
    Indicator = 0  495  32,672    99.0% 
         
Top 1% - Abn. Aud. Fees         
    Indicator = 1  22  310  6.6%   
    Indicator = 0  478  32,689    95.6% 
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Table 5: Costs of unconfirmed fraud campaigns on targeted firms - Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the results of univariate comparisons of changes in the mean values for 1) firms targeted with fraud allegations that are later not 
confirmed by the SEC or the court (Fraud Campaigns) and 2) firms targeted with allegations unrelated to accounting fraud such as overvaluation and stock 
promotion (Non-Fraud Campaigns) for the two years prior and the two years following these allegations. The sample consists of all campaigns covered by 
Activist Insights and excludes confirmed fraud allegations. To be included in the analysis, firms must have available data for all variables for at least one 
year prior to and one year following the allegation. This criterion is applied separately for the litigation, audit fees, and earnings tests. Bolded values indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 percent levels. To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3.  
 Non-Fraud Campaigns  Fraud Campaigns    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
 N  Pre  N  Post  Δ  N  Pre  N  Post  Δ  (10) - (5) 
Outcome Variables:                      
Dism. SCAt 536  0.009  545  0.013  0.004  83  0.000  85  0.106  0.106  0.102 
Log Feest 588  13.504  608  13.642  0.139  116  13.077  113  13.493  0.416  0.277 
Earningst 649  -0.181  672  -0.189  -0.008  127  -0.058  127  -0.003  0.055  0.063 
                      
Dism. SCA – Controls:                      
Log MVEt-1 536  6.627  545  6.933  0.305  83  6.304  85  6.658  0.354  0.049 
Sales Growtht-1 536  6.627  545  6.933  0.305  83  6.304  85  6.658  0.354  0.049 
CARt-1 536  0.123  545  0.117  -0.006  83  0.208  85  0.243  0.035  0.041 
Skewnesst-1 536  0.127  545  0.139  0.011  83  0.221  85  0.077  -0.145  -0.156 
Volatitilityt-1 536  0.311  545  0.352  0.041  83  0.177  85  0.403  0.226  0.185 
Turnovert-1 536  0.158  545  0.167  0.009  83  0.155  85  0.148  -0.007  -0.016 
                      
Log Fees – Controls:                      
Log MVEt 588  6.561  608  6.714  0.153  116  6.161  113  6.271  0.110  -0.043 
Leveraget 588  0.173  608  0.207  0.035  116  0.157  113  0.199  0.041  0.007 
ROAt 588  -0.189  608  -0.202  -0.013  116  -0.035  113  0.023  0.058  0.071 
Inv. & Receiv.t 588  0.165  608  0.161  -0.004  116  0.211  113  0.215  0.005  0.009 
CashFlowt 588  -0.069  608  -0.081  -0.012  116  0.022  113  0.055  0.034  0.046 
Tenuret 588  1.782  608  1.916  0.134  116  1.286  113  1.486  0.201  0.067 
Auditor Switcht 588  0.065  608  0.066  0.001  116  0.112  113  0.106  -0.006  -0.007 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Log Fees – Controls:                      
Losst 588  0.512  608  0.556  0.044  116  0.293  113  0.265  -0.028  -0.072 
Acquisit.t 588  0.287  608  0.317  0.030  116  0.397  113  0.389  -0.007  -0.037 
Big 4t 588  0.636  608  0.640  0.004  116  0.474  113  0.575  0.101  0.097 
Opiniont 588  0.184  608  0.148  -0.036  116  0.164  113  0.133  -0.031  0.005 
For. Oper.t 588  0.430  608  0.451  0.020  116  0.302  113  0.354  0.052  0.032 
Intang.t 588  0.167  608  0.186  0.019  116  0.180  113  0.191  0.011  -0.008 
CRt 588  4.152  608  4.044  -0.109  116  2.965  113  3.428  0.463  0.572 
 
Earnings - Controls:                      
Earningst-1 649  -0.248  672  -0.168  0.080  127  -0.131  127  0.006  0.137  0.058 
SG&At-1 649  0.399  672  0.324  -0.075  127  0.276  127  0.188  -0.088  -0.014 
Leveraget-1 649  0.214  672  0.191  -0.023  127  0.179  127  0.176  -0.003  0.020 
Losst-1 649  0.478  672  0.519  0.042  127  0.315  127  0.252  -0.063  -0.105 
Acquisit.t-1 649  0.268  672  0.275  0.007  127  0.299  127  0.433  0.134  0.127 
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Table 6: Costs of unconfirmed fraud campaigns on targeted firms 
        
This table presents results from estimating equations 2-4 to provide a difference-in-differences estimation 
of changes in non-meritorious litigation risk, audit fees, and earnings for firms targeted with fraud 
allegations that are later not confirmed by the SEC or the court relative to firms targeted with non-fraud 
allegations. The analysis examines the two years prior to and the two years following the allegation. The 
sample consists of all campaigns covered by Activist Insights and excludes confirmed fraud allegations. 
Columns 1 and 2 examine changes in non-meritorious litigation risk (Dism. SCA), columns 3 and 4 
changes in audit fees (Log Fees), and columns 5 and 6 changes in earnings (Earnings). Standard errors 
appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  
Dism. 
SCA 
 Dism. 
SCA  
Log 
Fees  
Log 
Fees  
Earnings 
 
Earnings 
Posti,t  0.02  0.01  -0.06**  -0.07***  0.01  0.01 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Post x Fraud Campaigni,t  0.09***  0.09***  0.16**  0.14**  0.04  0.04 
 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.067)  (0.061)  (0.045)  (0.042) 
Log MVEi,t-1    0.01         
 
 
  (0.010)         
Sales Growthi,t-1    0.03         
 
 
  (0.028)         
CARi,t-1    0.01         
 
 
  (0.013)         
Skewnessi,t-1    0.01         
 
 
  (0.006)         
Volatilityi,t-1    -0.11         
 
 
  (0.101)         
Turnoveri,t-1    0.00         
 
 
  (0.002)         
Fraud Alleg.i,t  -0.04  -0.04  0.01  0.01  -0.03  -0.03 
 
 (0.054)  (0.050)  (0.148)  (0.131)  (0.059)  (0.059) 
Log MVEi,t        0.07**     
 
 
      (0.026)     
Leveragei,t        0.28**     
 
 
      (0.133)     
ROAi,t        0.08     
 
 
      (0.065)     
Inv. & Receiv.i,t        -0.67**     
 
 
      (0.301)     
CashFlowi,t        0.10     
 
 
      (0.107)     
Tenurei,t        0.04     
 
 
      (0.048)     
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Table 6 (Continued)             
VARIABLES  
Dism. 
SCA 
 Dism. 
SCA  
Log 
Fees  
Log 
Fees  
Earnings 
 
Earnings 
Audtor Switchi,t        0.04     
 
 
      (0.073)     
Lossi,t        0.03     
 
 
      (0.041)     
Acquist.i,t        0.03     
 
 
      (0.033)     
Big 4i,t        0.52***     
 
 
      (0.129)     
Opinioni,t        -0.00     
 
 
      (0.044)     
For. Oper.i,t        0.13*     
 
 
      (0.077)     
Intang.i,t        0.34*     
 
 
      (0.191)     
CRi,t        -0.01*     
 
 
      (0.003)     
Earningsi,t-1            0.00 
 
 
          (0.085) 
SG&Ai,t-1            -0.10 
 
 
          (0.079) 
Leveragei,t-1            -0.03 
 
 
          (0.095) 
Lossi,t-1            0.02 
 
 
          (0.026) 
Acquisit.i,t-1            0.00 
 
 
          (0.018) 
 
 
           
Observations  1,249  1,249  1,425  1,425  1,575  1,575 
R-squared  0.327   0.335   0.952   0.957   0.748   0.752 
Firm and Year FE   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table 7: SCAs outcomes 
      
This table presents results from estimating equation 5 examining whether SCAs including allegations 
similar in nature to the allegations raised by the activist or which directly name the activist are more 
meritorious and thus more likely to settle. The sample consists of all SCAs filed between 2006 and 2015 
and excludes on-going SCAs. The dependent variable in column 1 is whether a case was settled. In 
column 2, cases that settled for an ‘nuisance’ amount, defined as SCAs settling for less than $1M (Skinner 
1997), are classified as dismissed. Column 3 examines settlement amounts. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses and are clustered by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
(two-tail), respectively. To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1 and 99 percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3.   
   (1)   (2)   (3) 
VARIABLES  Settled  Settled (> $1M)  Log Settlement 
              
Activist Case  0.19**  0.22***  3.10** 
  (0.076)  (0.077)  (1.198) 
Top 5 Law Firm  0.18***  0.18***  3.39*** 
  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.999) 
Maximum Damages  0.06***  0.05**  1.03*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.346) 
SEC Enforcement  0.15**  0.16***  2.72*** 
  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.946) 
Log MVE  -0.05**  -0.05**  -0.70** 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.354) 
ROA  -0.18  -0.23  -2.98 
  (0.169)  (0.168)  (2.670) 
TobinsQ  -0.01  -0.01  -0.09 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.228) 
Institutional Ownership  -0.13  -0.09  -1.84 
 
 (0.079)  (0.079)  (1.270) 
Log Analysts  0.02  0.04  0.68 
 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.589) 
Restatement  0.05  0.05  0.80 
  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.768) 
       
Observations  514  514  514 
R-squared  0.138  0.144  0.159 
Year and FF12 FE  YES  YES  YES 
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Table 8: Bid-ask spread changes 
This table presents results from estimating equation 6 examining changes in information 
asymmetry following activists’ accounting fraud allegations that are later not confirmed 
by the SEC or the court relative to activists’ non-fraud allegations. The dependent 
variable in column 1 is average bid-ask spread for a 20-day window following the 
allegation less average bid-ask spread for a similar window prior to the allegation. 
Column 2 uses a 40-day window, column 3 a 90-day window, and column 4 a 180-day 
window. Standard errors appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. To 
minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 
99 percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES  20-day  40-day  90-day  180-day 
                  
Fraud Report  0.04**  0.05**  0.06*  0.07 
  (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.043) 
Log MVE 1  0.01  0.02***  0.03***  0.04** 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
Turnover 1  -0.00***  -0.00**  -0.00*  -0.00 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log Price  -0.01  -0.03**  -0.06***  -0.07*** 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.023) 
Volatility 1  -0.18*  -0.29**  -0.86***  -1.25*** 
  (0.107)  (0.141)  (0.204)  (0.270) 
Book-to-Market  -0.06***  -0.10***  -0.11**  -0.11* 
  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.046)  (0.058) 
         
Observations  518  518  518  518 
R-squared  0.171  0.222  0.245  0.257 
Year and FF12 FE   YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table 9: Alternative definitions of Confirmed Fraud for the predictive analysis 
This table presents results from equation 1 examining the predictive power of activists’ fraud allegations using alternative definitions of Conf. 
Fraud. Columns 1-4 define Conf. Fraud using SCAs that settled for over $1M and AAERs. Columns 5-8 define Conf. Fraud using only AAERs. 
Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 present results examining all firm-years, for the period 2006-2015, with available data on Compustat and CRSP. Columns 
3, 4, 7 and 8 focus on all campaigns covered by Activist Insights and examine whether the fraud allegations provide additional predictive power 
over and above simply being the target of an activist. Standard errors appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
  Conf. Fraud = SCAs (>$1M) and AAERs  Conf. Fraud = AAERs 
VARIABLES 
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Fraud Alleg.  0.21***  0.21***  0.18***  0.19***  0.06**  0.06**  0.03*  0.04* 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Abn. Short Int.  0.12***    -0.18    0.03**    -0.08   
  (0.031)    (0.119)    (0.011)    (0.052)   
F-score  0.01***    -0.00*    0.00***    0.00   
  (0.002)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)   
Mod. Jones  -0.00    0.02    -0.00    0.01   
  (0.002)    (0.010)    (0.001)    (0.004)   
Abn. Aud. Fees  0.00    -0.05**    -0.00    -0.01   
  (0.002)    (0.026)    (0.001)    (0.009)   
Top 1% - Abn. Short Int.    0.04**    -0.07**    0.01    -0.03* 
    (0.021)    (0.032)    (0.007)    (0.017) 
Top 1% - F-score    0.02*    -0.04    0.01    -0.03* 
    (0.012)    (0.084)    (0.007)    (0.016) 
Top 1% - Mod. Jones    -0.00    0.20    -0.00***    -0.02 
    (0.006)    (0.157)    (0.001)    (0.021) 
Top 1% - Abn. Aud. Fees    0.04***    -0.12**    0.00    -0.01 
    (0.013)    (0.048)    (0.004)    (0.018) 
Control Variables Included 
 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES                  
Observations 
 
33,499  33,499  608  608  33,499  33,499  608  608 
R-squared 
 
0.046  0.045  0.215  0.214  0.016  0.015  0.121  0.122 
Year and FF12 FE   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table 10: Reaction from attorneys and the SEC – Reverse Mergers 
This table presents descriptive statistics regarding actions taken by attorneys and the 
SEC in response to activists’ accounting fraud allegations. The analysis splits the 
sample based on whether the targeted firm got listed in the US through a reverse 
merger (RM firms) or through a traditional listing method (e.g., IPO) (Traditional 
firms). Using Activists Insights, SeekingAlpha, and major short-sellers’ website, I 
identify 50 accounting fraud campaigns against RM firms and 109 campaigns against 
Traditional firms. Any Response refers to a) a law firm announcing an investigation 
to evaluate the allegations and decide whether to file a SCA against the firm, b) an 
SEC investigation being announced, c) a SCA being filed, or d) an AAER being 
issued. SEC or SCA Actions refer to a) SEC investigation being announced, b) a SCA 
being filed, or c) an AAER being issued. Settled SCA or AAER refers to a) a settled 
SCA, or b) an AAER being issued. Pending SCA refers to on-going SCAs. 
Panel A: RM firms (Total Campaigns = 50)  
   Frequency   Average 
Any response   36  72% 
SEC or SCA Actions   28  56% 
Settled SCA or AAER   24  48% 
Pending SCA   0  0% 
      
Panel B: Traditional firms (Total Campaigns = 109)  
   Frequency   Average 
Any response   54  50% 
SEC or SCA Actions   41  38% 
Settled SCA or AAER   24  22% 
Pending SCA   6  6% 
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Table 11: Reverse Mergers 
Panel A presents results from estimating a modified version of equation 1 examining the predictive power of 
activist short-sellers’ fraud allegations against 1) firms that got listed in the US through a reverse merger (Fraud 
Alleg. – RM) and 2) traditionally listed firms (Fraud Alleg. – Traditional).  Columns 1 and 2 present results 
examining all firm-years, for the period 2006-2015, with available data on Compustat and CRSP. Columns 3 
and 4 focus on all campaigns covered by Activist Insights and examine whether the fraud allegation provides 
additional predictive power over and above simply being the target of an activist. Panel B presents results from 
estimating a modified version of equations 2-4 to provide a difference-in-differences estimation of changes in 
non-meritorious litigation risk, audit fees, and earnings for RM firms/Traditional firms targeted with fraud 
allegations that are later not confirmed by the SEC or the court relative to firms targeted with non-fraud 
allegations. Columns 1 and 2 examine changes in non-meritorious litigation risk (Dism. SCA), columns 3 and 4 
changes in audit fees (Log Fees), and columns 5 and 6 changes in earnings (Earnings). Fraud Campaign –RM 
(Traditional) refers to activists’ allegations made against a RM (traditional) firm. Panel C presents results from 
estimating a modified version of equation 5 examining whether SCAs including allegations similar in nature to 
the allegations raised by the activist or which directly name the activist are more meritorious and thus more 
likely to settle. The dependent variable in column 1 is whether a case was settled. In column 2, cases that settled 
for an ‘nuisance’ amount, defined as SCAs settling for less than $1M (Skinner 1997), are classified as 
dismissed. Column 3 examines settlement amounts. Activist Case – RM (Traditional) is an indicator variable set 
to one for SCAs related to reverse merger (traditional) firms and containing allegations similar in nature to the 
allegations raised by the activist. Panel D presents results from estimating equation 6 examining changes in 
information asymmetry following activists’ accounting fraud allegations that are later not confirmed by the SEC 
or the court relative non-fraud allegations. The dependent variable in column 1 is average bid-ask spread for a 
20-day window following the allegation less average bid-ask spread for a similar window prior to the allegation. 
Column 2 uses a 40-day window, column 3 a 90-day window, and column 4 a 180-day window. Standard errors 
appear in parentheses and are clustered by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two-tail), respectively. To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1 and 99 percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
Panel A: Predictive power of fraud allegation by activist short-sellers 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Variables  Conf. Fraud  Conf. Fraud  Conf. Fraud  Conf. Fraud 
Fraud Alleg. - RM  0.31***  0.31***  0.30***  0.32*** 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.104)  (0.102) 
Fraud Alleg. - Traditional  0.17***  0.18***  0.15***  0.15*** 
  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.051) 
Abn. Short Int.  0.12***       
  (0.031)       
F-score  0.01***       
  (0.002)       
Mod. Jones  -0.00       
  (0.002)       
Abn. Aud. Fees  0.00       
  (0.002)       
Top 1% - Abn. Short Int.    0.04**    -0.06 
    (0.021)    (0.034) 
Top 1% - F-score    0.03**    0.03 
    (0.012)    (0.099) 
Top 1% - Mod. Jones    -0.00    0.17 
    (0.006)    (0.151) 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
Top 1% - Abn. Aud. Fees    0.04***    -0.12** 
    (0.013)    (0.050) 
Control Variables Included  YES  YES  YES  YES 
          
Observations  33,499  33,499  608  608 
R-squared  0.049  0.048  0.222  0.221 
Year and FF12 FE   YES  YES  YES  YES 
 
 
Panel B: Costs of unconfirmed fraud campaigns on targeted firms 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
VARIABLES  Dism. SCA  Log Fees  Earnings 
           
Post  0.01  -0.07***  0.01 
  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.020) 
Post x Fraud Campaign – RM  0.04  0.32**  -0.01 
  (0.035)  (0.130)  (0.032) 
Post x Fraud Campaign –Traditional  0.11***  0.08  0.06 
  (0.036)  (0.069)  (0.054) 
Standalone Variables Included  YES  YES  YES 
Control Variables Included  YES  YES  YES 
  
     
Observations  1,249  1,425  1,575 
R-squared  0.337   0.958   0.752 
Firm and Year FE   YES   YES   YES 
 
Panel C: SCAs Outcome  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Settled  Settled (>1M)  Log Settlement 
             
Activist Case - RM  0.32***  0.35***  5.11*** 
  (0.106)  (0.108)  (1.622) 
Activist Case - Traditional  0.11  0.14  1.90 
  (0.091)  (0.093)  (1.469) 
Control Variables Included  YES  YES  YES 
       
Observations  514  514  514 
R-squared  0.143  0.148  0.163 
Year and FF12 FE  YES  YES  YES 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
Panel D: Bid-ask spread changes     
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES  20-day  40-day  90-day  180-day 
              
Fraud Report – RM  0.02  0.06  0.11  0.15 
  (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.077)  (0.095) 
Fraud Report – Traditional  0.04***  0.05**  0.05  0.04 
  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.044) 
Control Variables Included  YES  YES  YES  YES 
  
       
Observations  518  518  518  518 
R-squared  0.171  0.222  0.247  0.259 
Year and FF12 FE   YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table 12: Delisted Firms      
This table provides descriptive statistics regarding delistings that occurred following the initiation of a campaign containing unconfirmed fraud 
allegations. The table breaks down delistings based on the reason the firm got delisted as provided by CRSP. Any Action refers to a) a Law firm 
announcing investigation to evaluate whether to file a SCA against the firm, b) a SEC investigation being announced, or c) a SCA being filed. 
SEC Inv. Or SCA Fil. Refers to whether an SEC Investigation was initiated but no AAER was later filed or an SCA was filed and later got 
dismissed. 
   Days since First Alleg.  Actions Taken Summary 
Delisted Reason: 
N  Mean  Median  
Any 
Action 
 %   
SEC Inv. or 
SCA Fil. 
 %  
Bankruptcy 1  1553  1553  0  0%  0  0% 
Company request 1  1259  1259  0  0%  0  0% 
Delinquent in filing or non-payment of fees 7  744  812  4  57%  2  29% 
Does not meet exchange’s financ. guidelines 5  412  357  3  60%  1  20% 
Insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity 3  1687  1488  1  33%  0  0% 
Merger 27  925  812  6  22%  1  4% 
Price fell below acceptable level 3  1198  925  2  67%  1  33% 
Protection of investors 3  407  157  3  100%  2  67% 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Pre-announcement Trends 
Figure 1A presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns starting 20 days prior to the first report of each 
campaign and ending the day of the report. Figure 1B presents the number of unique IPs accessing the 
targeted firm’s filings on EDGAR over a similar time period. The shaded areas represent 95% confidence 
interval. The abnormal return is calculated by adjusting for decile size return. For firms delisted, the 
proceeds are reinvested in the remaining firms of the group. 
 
Figure 1A: BHAR 
 
Figure 1B: Number of unique IPs 
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Figure 2: Parallel Trend Assumption 
Figures 2A-2C present the regression coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed) that 
map out the treatment effect by event period. I replace Post and Post x Fraud Campaign from equations 
2-4 with indicator variables for each event period and each event period interacted with Fraud Campaign. 
I omit the year just prior to the fraud allegation and as such year t-1 serves as the benchmark for the 
remaining effects. Figure 2A presents results regarding non-meritorious litigation risk, Figure 2B 
regarding audit fees, and Figure 2C regarding earnings. Variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
 
Figure 2A: Non-meritorious Litigation Risk 
 
 
Figure 2B: Audit Fees 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
Figure 2C: Earnings 
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Figure 3: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
These figures plot the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns for a [0, 252] day window for: a) confirmed 
and unconfirmed fraud allegations (Figure 3A), and b) unconfirmed fraud allegations and non-fraud 
allegations (Figure 3B) made by activists covered by Activist Insights. The analysis includes all the 
reports in the Activist Insights and not only the initial report of each campaign. The shaded areas 
represent 95% confidence interval. The red (orange) [green] represents confirmed fraud allegations 
(unconfirmed fraud allegations) [non-fraud allegations]. The abnormal return is calculated by adjusting 
for decile size return. For firms delisted, the proceeds are reinvested in the remaining firms of the group. 
 
Figure 3A: Confirmed vs unconfirmed fraud campaigns 
 
Figure 3B: Unconfirmed fraud campaigns vs non-fraud campaigns 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES OF ARTICLES INCLUDED/EXCLUDED FROM SEEKINGALPHA 
To construct the SeekinAlpha sample, I first obtain all “Short Ideas” articles from SeekingAlpha 
for the period February 13, 2006 to December 31, 2015. I identify articles including one of the 
following keywords: 1) “fraud”, 2) “mislead”, 3) “overstat”, and 4) “understat.” I exclude 
articles for which the authors’ disclosures suggest that they do not currently hold a short position. 
I read the remaining articles to verify that the authors indeed allege fraud and that the articles are 
not simply summarizing recent events. Below I include an example of an article excluded and an 
article included in the final sample. 
 
Excluded 
The following report was excluded from the final sample as it refers to a SCA that has already 
been filed and as such does not bring any new information to the market, but rather simply 
summarizes recent events. 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Included 
The following article was included in the final sample as the activist releases new information to 
the market alleging that Amira Nature Foods is “fabricating its SEC financial statements.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF ACTIVISTS BEING THE FIRST TO UNCOVER THE FRAUD 
Appendix 2 provides an example where the SCA complaint directly refers to activists’ as the first 
market participants to reveal the fraud. The first identified complaint was filed against China 
Media Express Holdings merely 4 days following Citron’s report. Under the section “The truth 
about CCME’s massive fraud begins to emerge” included in the Amended Consolidated 
Complaint, the filing directly names Citron and Muddy waters as the first to reveal the fraud (see 
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1046/CCME00_01/20111024_f01x_1100804.pdf). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…  
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APPENDIX 3: VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Variable 
 
Definition 
Variables of Interest:  
 
Activist Case = The variable is used in examining the impact of activists’ fraud allegations 
on the legal system and as such it is defined at the SCA level. The variable 
is an indicator set to one if the SCA complaint contains allegations similar 
to those made by the activist or specifically names the activist; zero 
otherwise. 
Fraud Alleg. = The variable is used in examining the predictive power of activists’ fraud 
allegations and as such it is defined at the firm-year level. The variable is an 
indicator set to one if, over the 24 months following fiscal year end, an 
activist accuses the firm of committing accounting fraud; zero otherwise. 
 
Fraud Campaign = The variable is used in examining costs of unconfirmed fraud allegations on 
targeted firms and as such it is defined at the campaign level. The variable 
is an indicator set to one if the activist’s campaign contains accounting 
fraud allegations that are not later confirmed by the court or the SEC; zero 
otherwise. 
Fraud Report = The variable is used in examining changes in bid-ask spread following the 
release of an activist’s report and as such it is defined at the report level. 
The variable is an indicator set to one if the activist’s report contains 
accounting fraud allegations that are not later confirmed by the court or the 
SEC; zero otherwise. 
Post = The variable is used in examining costs of unconfirmed fraud allegations on 
targeted firms and as such it is defined at the campaign level. The variable 
is an indicator set to one for the two fiscal years following an activist’s 
campaign. 
*- RM = The * represents one of the following variables Activist Case, Fraud Alleg., 
Fraud Campaign, or Fraud Report. For the * variable to be set to one, the 
targeted firm needs to have been listed in the US through a reverse merger. I 
use two sources to identify RM firms. First, I read 8-Ks including item 5.06 
(Change in Shell Company Status) to identify whether it relates to a non-US 
reverse merger. Then, I supplement this list with Chinese reverse mergers 
identified by Bloomberg. 
*- Traditional = The * represents one of the following variables Activist Case, Fraud Alleg., 
Fraud Campaign, or Fraud Report. For the * variable to be set to one, the 
targeted firm must have not been listed in the US through a reverse merger. 
   
Dependent Variables: 
 
Conf. Fraud = An indicator variable set to one if the firm engaged in accounting fraud 
during the year. Fraud is defined using settled SCAs and AAERs with a 
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 violation. 
 
Dism. SCA = An indicator variable set to one if the SCA was dismissed; zero otherwise. 
Earnings = Earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. 
Log Fees = The natural logarithm of audit fees for the year. 
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Appendix 3 (Continued) 
Log Settlement = The natural logarithm of one plus the SCA settlement amount. The 
settlement amount for dismissed cases is set to zero. 
Settled = An indicator variable set to one if the SCA settles; zero otherwise. 
Settled (>$1M) = An indicator variable set to one if the SCA settles for more than $1M; zero 
otherwise. 
ΔSpread = The change in average bid-ask spread (scaled by the midpoint of bid-ask 
spread) for a given window prior to the allegation to a similar window 
following the initial report in each campaign. 
 
   
Control Variables  
 
Abn. Aud. Fees = The residual of the natural logarithm of audit fees regressed on 1) natural 
logarithm of total assets, 2) number of business segments, 3) inventory 
scaled by total assets, 4) receivables scaled by total assets, 5) current ratio, 
6) book-to-market, 7) total debt scaled by total assets, 8) square root of 
number of employees, 9) percent of sales abroad, 10) return on assets, 11) 
square root of years of auditor tenure, and indicator variables for 12) loss 
year, 13) M&A activity, 14) December year end client, 15) qualified 
opinion, 16) initial or secondary equity offering, 17) high litigation risk 
industry, 18) debt issuance, 19) Big 4 auditor, and 20) SIC1 industry 
classification. I run this specification by year and size decile. 
Abn. Short Interest = Model 1 of Abnormal Short Interest as per Karpoff and Lou (2010). More 
specifically, for each month I estimate the following OLS regression: 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑔𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝑔=𝑙𝑜𝑤
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑔𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝑔=𝑙𝑜𝑤
+ ∑ 𝑚𝑔𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝑔=𝑙𝑜𝑤
+∑𝛷𝜅𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝜅𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Size refers to market value of equity, BM to book-to-market and Mom to 
momentum (3-month window) and are calculated as of the beginning of the 
month. Each variable is then sorted into terciles. Ind represents 2-digit SIC 
fixed effects. The residual represents the abnormal short interest. As this is 
calculated at the monthly level, I use the average value of the whole year in 
the yearly analysis. 
Acquisit. = An indicator variable set to one if the firm made any acquisitions during the 
year that contributed to sales; zero otherwise. 
Auditor Switch = An indicator variable set to one if the firm changed auditor during the year; 
zero otherwise.  
Big 4 = An indicator variable set to one if the firm employs a Big 4 auditor; zero 
otherwise. 
Book-to-Market = The book value of equity over market value of equity. 
 
CashFlow = Cash flow from operating activities over total assets. 
CAR = Market-adjusted return, defined as the cumulative return measured over the 
fiscal year less the value-weighted market return over the same period. 
CR = Current ratio defined as current assets over current liabilities. 
Financing Need = An indicator variable set to one if cash flows from operations less capital 
expenditures scaled by current assets is less than -0.5; zero otherwise. 
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For. Oper. = An indicator variable set to one if the firm has sales abroad; zero otherwise. 
I use foreign taxes (txtfo per compustat) as a proxy. 
F-score = Model 1 of F-score as per Dechow et al. (2011). 
 
I/C Weak. = An indicator variable set to one if the auditor concludes that the firm’s 
internal controls over financial reporting are not effective; zero otherwise. 
Intang. = Total value of intangible assets over total assets. 
Institutional 
Ownership 
= Institutional ownership as of fiscal year end. 
Inv. & Receiv. = Inventory and total receivables over total assets. 
Leverage = Total long-term and short-term debt over total assets. Missing values of 
each measure are replaced with zero. 
Log Analysts = The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing annual 
forecasts. 
Log MVE = The natural logarithm of market value of equity as of fiscal year end. 
 
Log MVE 1 = The natural logarithm of market value of equity as of the last trading day 
prior to the release of the activist’s report. 
 
Log Price = The natural logarithm of price as of the last trading day prior to the release 
of the activist’s report. 
Loss = An indicator variable set to one if the firm had negative net income during 
the year; zero otherwise. 
Maximum Damages = The natural logarithm of estimated potential damages based on the total 
decline in market value of equity from the highest value during the class 
period to the trading day after class period end. If a price cannot be obtained 
following class period end, then the price is set equal to zero. 
Mod. Jones = Modified Jones discretionary accruals calculated at the 2-digit SIC code and 
year level. I require at least 15 observations per industry-year. 
  
No I/C Opinion = An indicator variable set to one if the auditor did not provide an opinion 
regarding the firms internal controls over financial reporting; zero 
otherwise. 
Opinion = An indicator variable set to one if current year’s financial statements did not 
receive a qualified opinion; zero otherwise. 
Restatement = An indicator variable set to one if any of the financial statements in the 
alleged fraud period have been restated; zero otherwise. 
ROA = Net income over total assets. 
Sales Growth = Net sales in current year minus net sales in prior year, divided by prior 
year’s total assets. 
SG&A = SG&A expense during the year over total assets. Missing values are 
replaced with zero. 
SEC Enforcement = An indicator variable set to one if the firm received an AAER regarding any 
of the quarters included in the SCA class period; zero otherwise. 
Skewness = Skewness of monthly raw returns during the fiscal year. 
Tenure = The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of years the current auditor has 
been auditing the firm’s financial statements. 
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TobinsQ = The sum of the market value of common stock, preferred stock and firm 
debt scaled by total assets. Preferred stock and debt are assumed to have a 
market value equal to book value. 
Top 1% - Abn. Aud. 
Fees 
 An indicator variable set to one if during the year the firm was ranked in the 
top 1% of firms with the highest Abn. Aud. Fees; zero otherwise. 
Top 1% - Abn. Short 
Interest 
= An indicator variable set to one if during the year the firm was ranked in the 
top 1% of firms with the highest Abn. Short Interest; zero otherwise. 
Top 1% - F-score = An indicator variable set to one if during the year the firm was ranked in the 
top 1% of firms with the highest F-score; zero otherwise. 
 
Top 1% - Mod. Jones = An indicator variable set to one if during the year the firm was ranked in the 
top 1% of firms with the highest Mod. Jones; zero otherwise. 
 
Top 5 Law Firm = An indicator variable set to one if a top five firm (and their successors) in 
the post-PSLRA era, as identified by Choi and Thompson (2006), are 
involved in the SCA; zero otherwise. 
Turnover = Monthly share turnover [trading volume/shares outstanding] measured over 
the fiscal year, scaled by 1,000 for readability.  
Turnover 1 = Share turnover [trading volume/shares outstanding] as of the last trading 
day prior to the initial report in each campaign. 
 
Volatility = Standard deviation of monthly raw returns during the fiscal year. 
 
Volatility 1 = Standard deviation of monthly raw returns over the 12-month period prior to 
the release of the activist’s report. 
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